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INTRODUCTION
Scholars often portray financial regulators as eternal followers of
the private sector, ever struggling to “keep pace” with technological
change.1 While this image captures the difficulty of regulating a dynamic industry, it also obscures central aspects of financial regulatory
practice. This Article challenges the conventional depiction by highlighting and examining a practice whereby regulators catalyze efforts
to transform financial market technology.
Consider one ambitious Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) effort to enhance the supervision of stock-market trading activity.2 Rather than hiring more staff or writing new rules of market conduct, the SEC has ordered the New York Stock Exchange, Nasdaq, and
other trading-venue operators to jointly build a massive market surveillance system called the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT).3 The idea
is simple, yet astounding in its scope. Expected to “ingest 58 billion
trade events on a daily basis” and to cost $2.4 billion to build, the CAT
is poised to become “the world’s largest data repository of securities
transactions.”4 With access to this big-data behemoth, the SEC
1. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL
REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 32 (2d ed. 2018) (noting the common scholarly claim that
“regulators cannot keep pace” with the evolution of the financial system); Leo E. Strine,
Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund
Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1959
(2017) (lamenting that section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act has “not kept pace”
with financial innovation); cf. CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE 223 (2017) (observing that regulators’ fears of “fall[ing] behind”
private-sector innovation contribute to a narrative that is easily “co-opted by industry
actors”).
2. See Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45,722 (Aug. 1, 2012).
3. See id. at 45,723 (requiring the development of a joint plan to “govern the creation, implementation, and maintenance of a consolidated audit trail and central repository”).
4. Elizabeth P. Gray & Catherine E. Fata, Increased Use of Big Data in SEC Enforcement, 50 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REGUL. 145, 147 (2017); Order Approving the
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believes it will be better equipped to police market manipulation and
address risks posed by algorithmic trading.5
The CAT is but one example of a practice in which financial regulators seek to construct or renovate financial market infrastructure.6
Sometimes, agencies build it themselves: the Federal Reserve (Fed),
for instance, owns and operates payment platforms that transmit trillions of dollars each day.7 More often, as with the CAT, agencies coerce
industry actors into doing the gritty work. As shorthand, I will refer to
this kind of activity as infrastructural reengineering.8 Through such efforts, agencies reshape the deep design of the financial markets’ infrastructural systems—trading platforms, payment networks, data repositories, and more—in service of policy goals and statutory
mandates.9
The practice has a long history. An early reengineering attempt—
a failed one—took place in 1938, with then-SEC Chairman William O.
National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail, Exchange Act
Release No. 79,318, 81 Fed. Reg. 84,696, 84,863 (Nov. 23, 2016) (justifying an SEC estimate of $2.4 billion in up-front industry implementation costs).
5. See Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. at 45,731, 45,747 (describing the
utility of expanded data access when investigating market manipulation and destabilizing market events like the flash crash of May 2010).
6. Throughout the Article, when using the term “infrastructure,” I mean to denote the set of networked systems that intermediate transactions in the financial markets. For detailed background on these systems, see infra Part I.
7. See Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Wishnick, Private Markets, Public Options,
and the Payment System, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 380, 388 (2020) (“The Fed operates multiple payment platforms that its thousands of accountholders—mainly banks, government entities, and private financial utilities—use to transmit over three trillion dollars
between their Federal Reserve bank accounts on a daily basis.”).
8. In describing the construction and renovation of financial market infrastructure as a kind of engineering, I am picking up a longstanding (and, in my view, evocative) usage. See, e.g., ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 131 (2011) (describing a Bank of Japan effort to “engineer[]” a new payment system); Joseph H. Sommer, A Law of Financial Accounts: Modern Payment and Securities Transfer Law, 53 BUS. LAW. 1181, 1197 (1998) (comparing
the rules governing payment and securities transfer systems to works of civil engineering); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Property, Credit, and Regulation Meet Information
Technology: Clearance and Settlement in the Securities Markets, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 131, 132 (1992) (discussing “the challenges that confront . . . legal ‘engineers’”
when dealing with technological change in securities market infrastructure). To clear
up a potential source of confusion, the engineering I am talking about is different from
the “transaction cost engineering” work done by deal lawyers. See Ronald J. Gilson,
Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255
(1984) (introducing a conception of deal lawyers as transaction cost engineers). Gilson’s idea focuses on bespoke contract negotiations, see id. at 256–58, whereas the idea
I am invoking focuses on the design of completely standardized transactional systems.
9. See infra Part II.
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Douglas at the helm.10 Recent efforts in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 have completely remade the infrastructure of
derivatives markets by standardizing trade data and prompting the
creation of central counterparty clearinghouses.11 In between, infrastructural reengineering has enabled regulators to do everything from
prevent securities theft to eliminate once-fearsome sources of systemic risk.12 Existing literature has evaluated many of these efforts
and proposed new ones on a market-specific basis.13 This Article’s
contribution is to explore the practical and theoretical lessons that can
be learned by examining reengineering efforts collectively, as constituents of a general category of practice.
Specifically, the Article aims to develop the literature’s understanding of why and how regulators engage in the potentially transformative (and often costly) practice of reshaping financial market infrastructure. It focuses, in particular, on three federal financial
10. See infra Part II.B.1.
11. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How To
Make a Global Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1309–24 (2014)
(describing the mandatory creation of central counterparty clearinghouses for overthe-counter derivatives markets).
12. See infra Part II. Systemic risk refers to “the risk of socially unbearable macroeconomic consequences” arising from the bankruptcy, distress, or breakdown of individual financial firms or infrastructure institutions. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of
Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 446 (2011).
13. For examples of the case-specific literature on financial market infrastructure, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Global Standards for Securities Holding Infrastructures:
A Soft Law/Fintech Model for Reform, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 531 (2019), which proposes
reforms to securities holding infrastructure; Delphine Nougayrède, Towards a Global
Financial Register? The Case for End Investor Transparency in Central Securities Depositories, 4 J. FIN. REGUL. 276 (2018), which argues for transparent central securities depositories; Paolo Saguato, The Liquidity Dilemma and the Repo Market: A Two-Step Policy Option To Address the Regulatory Void, 22 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85 (2017), which
proposes reforms to repo market infrastructure; Dan Awrey, The Mechanisms of Derivatives Market Efficiency, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1104, 1156–79 (2016), which evaluates reforms to derivatives market infrastructure; Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 276
(2015), which examines the “complete[] transform[ation]” of stock market infrastructure in light of “the information-technology revolution”; and Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse
Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1641 (2013), which evaluates reform efforts regarding derivatives market infrastructure. For examination of the technological aspects of
securities regulatory concerns outside the context of network infrastructure, see Jill E.
Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor, 102 MINN.
L. REV. 11 (2017), which examines the interaction of technology and regulation in addressing corporate voting deficiencies; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging
Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227 (2008), which examines the prospects for
reform of corporate voting institutions and their technological infrastructure; and
George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227 (2018).
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regulators that Congress has directly tasked with oversight of market
infrastructure: the SEC, Fed, and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).14 We know a great deal about why and how these
agencies use many tools in their toolkits, from supervision to capital
regulation.15 This Article aims to develop a similarly detailed sense of
why and how regulators lead efforts to reengineer the markets’ transactional systems. What can regulators hope to achieve by altering the
underlying “rails,”16 “platforms,”17 and “plumbing”18 of the financial
markets? How should they go about doing so? Are there pitfalls they
should avoid? In addressing these questions, the Article highlights
how financial regulators engage with system transformation and technological change well outside the “pace-keeping” paradigm.19
The Article’s first claim is that reengineering efforts enable financial technocrats to impose a distinctive form of control over financial
activity—one that legal theorists have, in other contexts, conceptualized as “architectural regulation.”20 Architectural regulation refers to
the way that things like speed bumps, door locks, website designs, and
other durable “structures of social life” regulate behavior.21 Scholars
14. See 12 U.S.C. § 5464 (placing primary responsibility for oversight of systemically important financial market infrastructure institutions in the hands of the SEC,
CFTC, and Fed).
15. See, e.g., BARR ET AL., supra note 1, at 259–332 (discussing capital regulation
and supervision).
16. Id. at 796 (describing payment systems as “rails”).
17. Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO.
L.J. 235, 257 (2019) (describing derivatives trading venues as “platforms”).
18. Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex To Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the
SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1703 (2012) (describing stock-market
infrastructure as “plumbing”).
19. Cf. Cary Coglianese, Regulatory Vigilance in a Changing World, REGUL. REV.
(Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/02/25/coglianese-innovation
-regulatory-vigilance [https://perma.cc/P3ZY-SXZE] (discussing the pace-keeping
problem across the administrative state); Gary E. Marchant, Addressing the Pacing
Problem, in THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL
OVERSIGHT 199 (Gary E. Marchant, Braden R. Allenby & Joseph R. Herkert eds., 2011)
(same).
20. See, e.g., Sarah Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through Physical Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934, 1942–49
(2015) (reviewing literature on architectural regulation); Lawrence Lessig, The New
Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998) (first introducing the concept to legal literature); Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121 (1980) (exemplifying groundwork outside of legal theory).
21. Lessig, supra note 20, at 665–66; see also Kate Klonick, The New Governors:
The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1616–
18 (2018) (discussing the role of design in structuring the free speech situation on the
Internet); Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100
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of financial regulation have begun to explore this idea in relation to
compliance and risk-management software.22 I build on this literature
by arguing that the devices, operating protocols, and technical standards constituting financial market infrastructure exert a similar governing force—for instance, by making certain activities more or less
difficult to undertake, or more or less visible to regulatory authorities.23 Past and present efforts to reengineer market systems alike aim
at leveraging the power of these key technologies.
To shed light on this practice, the Article begins by exploring
three case studies. The first highlights the way a late-1960s change to
the infrastructure of the securities markets helped prevent securities
theft.24 The second looks at the creation of CLS Bank, a payment system that currently transmits over a trillion dollars each day and that
is named for its “continuous linked settlement” operating protocol.25
CLS Bank is famous among lawyers for raising knotty questions of
software patentability;26 here it illustrates how financial market infrastructure can be designed to prevent undesirable risk-taking.27 And
the third case looks at an episode of data standardization in the credit
NW. U. L. REV. 655, 689–91, 704 n.289 (2006) (discussing architectural barriers to
speeding and trespassing).
22. See, e.g., Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
323, 356–57 (2011) (arguing that software systems exert control over investor behavior); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669 (2010) (exploring how compliance software intentionally
and unintentionally structures corporate risk-taking); Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and
Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127 (2009) (arguing that proprietary risk modeling software imposed architectural control on financial institution decision-making in the
lead-up to the Global Financial Crisis); cf. James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by
Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1722–23 (2005) (arguing that what Lessig calls “architecture” functions so differently in different sociotechnical contexts that it ought to be
disaggregated).
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part II.B.1. This effort also famously sped up the securities market’s
back-office processes. Cf. Wyatt Wells, Certificates and Computers: The Remaking of
Wall Street, 1967 to 1971, 74 BUS. HIST. REV. 193 (2000). However, I will focus on its
impact on securities theft.
25. See CLS FX Trading Activity January 2020, CLS GRP., https://www.cls-group
.com/news/cls-fx-trading-activity-january-2020 [https://perma.cc/WDU4-W7FV]
(“In January 2020[, t]he average daily traded volume submitted to CLS was USD1.77
trillion.”).
26. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). See generally
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1115 (2015) (discussing the case’s role in delineating the
outer bounds of patentability).
27. See infra Part II.B.2.
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derivatives market that was a rare bright spot in the lead-up to the
Global Financial Crisis.28 Taken together, these cases show how past
regulators have relied on changes to technical aspects of market infrastructure to fulfill statutory mandates from investor protection to crisis prevention.
After presenting these three examples, the Article then analyzes
them to develop a sense of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of reengineering in different contexts.29 When is the practice
most likely to be valuable? How should regulators go about working
with, and motivating, the private sector to participate in these efforts?
What kinds of tradeoffs are regulators likely to face when considering
reengineering efforts? Through analysis of both substantive and procedural aspects of the practice, I sketch out answers to those questions. First, I highlight the ability of infrastructural reengineering to
reduce the variable costs of regulation, remove discretion from regulatory domains, and entrench governance decisions in the design of
market technology.30 Second, I discuss the conditions under which
regulators should seek to coordinate industry actors in reengineering
efforts and the conditions under which regulators should opt for coercive tactics.31 Finally, I consider potential systemic consequences,
including the possibility that regulators deepen the problem of riskcentralization through their reengineering efforts.32
With that framework in mind, the Article then identifies and evaluates opportunities for infrastructural reengineering efforts today.33
In particular, the Article examines how the SEC can reduce the systemic risk posed by a major infrastructural institution in the securities
market;34 how the SEC should proceed on the CAT;35 and how the Fed,
SEC, and CFTC can work together to enhance the range and quality of
market data that inform their crisis-prevention activities.36 To seize
these opportunities, regulators would be wise to draw from past episodes of infrastructural reengineering to inform the work of the present day.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See infra Part II.B.3.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra Part IV.A.3.
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Taken as a whole, the Article’s account supplements prevailing
paradigms about who leads efforts to integrate new technologies into
the financial sector. The predominant mode of scholarship casts private actors as potentially creative (and unruly) innovators and financial regulators as under-resourced (and often hapless) technocrats
who must deal with what the innovators have wrought.37 This frame
captures some of our present reality, but it lacks a place for the regulator-led practice of infrastructural reengineering. By shining a light
on the ways that the Fed, SEC, and CFTC affirmatively reshape financial market infrastructure, the Article joins a burgeoning body of
scholarship examining how the financial regulatory state is not just a
follower but also a leader in the process of updating financial technology.38
The Article also contributes to scholarly understandings of the financial sector’s increasingly blurry public-private divide.39 The task
37. Cf., e.g., FORD, supra note 1, at 153–55 (describing the private financial industry in response to the question, “Who Is Innovating?,” and calling for a new framework
for engagement with financial innovation); Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process
of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 333, 340 (1989) (describing the innovation process that takes place among financial firms, with help from their lawyers).
38. One vein of this literature examines the involvement of financial regulators in
the design and promotion of compliance software, risk models, and data-analysis software. See, e.g., Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157 (2020); Hilary J. Allen, Experimental Strategies for Regulating Fintech, 3 J.L. & INNOVATION 1 (2020);
James Fanto, Dashboard Compliance: Benefit, Threat, or Both?, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 1 (2016); Onnig H. Dombalagian, Preserving Human Agency in Automated Compliance, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 71 (2016); James A. Fanto, The Vanishing Supervisor, 41 J. CORP. L. 117 (2015); Bamberger, supra note 22; Gerding, supra note 22.
Another examines the possibilities for public innovation in the payment and banking
systems. See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, John Crawford & Lev Menand, FedAccounts: Digital
Dollars, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113 (2021); Robert Hockett, Digital Greenbacks: A Sequenced ‘TreasuryDirect’ and ‘FedWallet’ Plan for the Democratic Digital Dollar (May
18, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3599419; ContiBrown & Wishnick, supra note 7. See also sources cited supra note 13 for discussions
of the roles of financial regulators in guiding the development of individual market infrastructure institutions. A third line of inquiry expands the lens to develop a financialregulatory ethos that is proactive across the board. See Saule T. Omarova, Technology
v. Technocracy: Fintech as a Regulatory Challenge, 6 J. FIN. REGUL. 75 (2020).
39. See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1657–68
(2018); Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 757; Robert C.
Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017);
Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMPAR. ECON. 315, 315 (2013) (stating that finance “occup[ies] an essentially hybrid place between state and market”);
Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to
the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009).
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of financial regulation is inevitably a “collaborative, cooperative enterprise” operating across that boundary, albeit sometimes a fraught
one.40 This Article shows the design of financial market infrastructure
to be a key product of the collaboration.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I takes the reader on a quick
tour of financial market infrastructure—the systems that are the objects of reengineering efforts. Part II presents three case studies of infrastructural reengineering, illuminating how the practice enables
regulators to control financial activity at the level of system design.
Part III develops a framework for analyzing where reengineering is
likely to be most useful, distilling a set of guiding principles for future
reengineering efforts. With those principles in hand, Part IV suggests
efforts that regulators should prioritize and reevaluates the government’s role within broader discourse about innovation in the financial
markets.
I. A QUICK TOUR OF MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE
To set the stage for the Article’s analysis of the promise and perils
of public-private reengineering efforts, this Part provides background
on the systems being reengineered. Earlier, I described these systems
in metaphorical terms—as the “rails,” “platforms,” and “plumbing” of
finance.41 These metaphors are useful because they point to the essential roles played by market infrastructure. They also hint at the importance of standardization in making market infrastructure work.42
But the metaphors can only take us so far. In the field of financial regulation, “infrastructure” is a term of art, and, unlike physical rails or
plumbing, some readers may lack an intuitive sense of what the
40. Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 427 (2011).
41. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
42. The importance of standardization to financial markets is an old idea. See
René Demogue, Analysis of Fundamental Notions, in MODERN FRENCH LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
§ 262, at 471, 471–73 (Ethel Clara Forbes Scott & Joseph P. Chamberlain trans., 1916)
(discussing the forces militating in favor of “making transactions rapid” through the
use of “simple formalities”—a technique “peculiarly well adapted to a world of the initiated, such as stockbrokers, merchants, or investors”). The treatment of standardized
financial systems as a kind of machine, however, is a new one. See Margaret Jane Radin,
Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
1125, 1138 (2002) (arguing that “the digital revolution is bringing about a seismic shift
in our conceptual landscape, [namely] . . . the breakdown of the distinction between
text and technology, or between expression and functionality, or between words and
machine”); see also Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David Wishnick, Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591 (2019) (exploring this merger
of text and machine through a study of smart contracts).
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infrastructural systems of the financial markets do. For that reason, it
will be useful to take a quick tour of their operations. Those who already possess knowledge of financial market infrastructure should
skip to Part II.
A. TRADING VENUES
Our tour begins with the most prominent infrastructural institutions in the markets—trading venues. These are the sites where market participants enter into contracts to exchange money for other financial assets.43 As the digital age has progressed, trading venues
have transmuted from physical marketplaces—iconic locations like
the floor of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the octagonal pits
of the Chicago Board of Trade—into online platforms.44 Today, the
floor of the NYSE mostly serves as a television set for CNBC’s financial
news coverage.45 Unlike the shouts and gestures of the people who
populated the physical trading venues in their heyday, activity in the
online venues is barely seen and never heard.46 But in all cases, market
participants seek to trade where a critical mass of other traders gather
and where prices best reflect something like “true” supply and demand.47
To transact with each other, traders rely on the legal and technical aspects of platforms like the NYSE. The key legal features are
membership rules (who can participate in trading), conduct rules
(how participants must behave), and the private enforcement apparatus backing up those rules.48 The key technical features are

43. Cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities
Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 563–64 (2005) (describing the
rise of diverse trading venues in competition with the once-monolithic exchanges).
44. For detailed analysis of this shift, see CAITLIN ZALOOM, OUT OF THE PITS: TRADERS
AND TECHNOLOGY FROM CHICAGO TO LONDON (2006).
45. See Tom Butts, CNBC Moves to the Stock Exchange Floor, TV TECH (Feb. 14,
2012), https://www.tvtechnology.com/news/cnbc-moves-to-the-stock-exchange
-floor [https://perma.cc/LE5Y-KWZ6] (quoting a CNBC executive as saying that “our
set designer worked closely with the NYSE staff and architects who are redesigning the
floor of the exchange”).
46. See ZALOOM, supra note 44, at 148, 157 (describing the din of the trading floor
and the silence of electronic trading desks).
47. See, e.g., Macey & O’Hara, supra note 43, at 568–69.
48. See Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as Regulators: A Survey, 80
S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1246–57 (2007); cf. Stuart Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock
Exchange, 1791-1860, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 113 (1998) (arguing that “[t]he origin and
the early growth of the New York Stock and Exchange Board can be attributed in large
part to the brokers’ success in regulating themselves”).
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standardized communication protocols that mediate exchange.49 In
other words, trading platforms, like every infrastructural institution
we will see on this tour, comprise private membership and conduct
rules, devices, and operating rules that enable parties to transact with
each other.50 These systems necessarily involve “a combination of human practices and technological materials.”51 And as we shall see, the
technologies and protocols used to mediate transactions govern market participants just as surely as traditional rules and regulations do.52
Though this Article focuses on regulatory leadership of reengineering efforts to harness that governing power, regulators certainly
are not the only potential leaders on the scene. Private actors have
driven electronification in the stock market, for instance, where a
growing set of electronic communications networks and “dark pools”
now compete with the NYSE and Nasdaq.53 Private innovation is always ongoing, and it serves as the backdrop to the regulatory efforts
explored below.
B. POST-TRADE SYSTEMS
Trading is only the first step in a successful transaction. After parties make a trade, they must perform in accordance with their

49. See, e.g., Macey & O’Hara, supra note 43, at 590 (describing the way that “technology . . . determines [the] operational efficiency of trade processing and trading capacity” for any given venue).
50. In the field of commercial law, the idea of transactional “systems” has been
used to characterize the structures in question. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, ELIZABETH WARREN, DANIEL KEATING, RONALD J. MANN & ROBERT M. LAWLESS, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS:
A SYSTEMS APPROACH, at xxxix, 359 (6th ed. 2016) (describing transactional systems as
comprising “not only abstract legal rules, but also people who engage in commercial
transactions, contracts that are designed to guide those transactions, and physical
tools that facilitate those transactions”). At a higher level of generality, these systems
are just a particular kind of institution that relies on what David Grewal has called “network standards.” See DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF
GLOBALIZATION 20–22 (2008) (defining a network standard as a “shared norm or practice that enables network members to gain access to one another, facilitating their cooperation”).
51. ZALOOM, supra note 44, at xi.
52. Cf. Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1,
43 (2006) (highlighting the “inevitab[ility]” of “a form of discipline that incorporates
some form of regulation-by-protocol” in our networked information society).
53. See, e.g., Fox et al., supra note 13, at 191; Donald C. Langevoort, Information
Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985) (addressing the implications of electronic systems and computer technology on the securities regulatory regime).

2390

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:2379

contractual promises. Though the post-trade process is entirely “unglamorous,” the systems that handle it are essential to financial markets.54
Post-trade systems may be divided into four categories of functionality: clearing, settlement, payment, and reporting. To keep things
simple, this Part walks through each function as it plays out in the
stock market. The basic concepts are similar, if not exactly the same,
in other markets.55
Clearing. After trades are made, they are cleared. Clearing refers
to the process through which traders’ obligations to each other are
verified and computed.56 For instance, imagine that Dealer A sells Apple stock to Broker B through a Nasdaq trading venue. After the trade
is made, Nasdaq will report the trade in a standardized data format to
an institution called the National Securities Clearing Corporation
(NSCC).57 The NSCC clears nearly every trade that takes place in the
public stock market.58 First, the NSCC vets and validates the trade information it receives. Then, in a legal act called “novation,” it places
itself between sellers and buyers.59 In our Apple example, Dealer A
would owe stock to the NSCC, and Broker B would owe cash. The NSCC
would, in turn, owe cash to Dealer A and stock to Broker B. This function earns the NSCC the moniker of central counterparty clearinghouse: it becomes “the seller to every buyer and the buyer to every
seller.”60 The clearinghouse is a conduit every bit as important as the
trading venue itself.
54. HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE:
AND REGULATION 752 (23d ed. 2020).

TRANSACTIONS, POLICY,

55. See generally Guido Ferrarini & Paulo Saguato, Regulating Financial Market
Infrastructures, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 568 (Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran & Jennifer Payne eds., 2015).
56. See COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & TECH.
COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 155 (2012) [hereinafter PFMIS], http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3S86-P37F] (stating that clearance refers to “the computation of
the counterparties’ obligations to make deliveries or payments on the settlement date”
of a trade).
57. See Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, Exchange Act Release No. 80,295,
116 SEC Docket 1570, 1575 (Mar. 22, 2017) [hereinafter T+2 Settlement Cycle Adopting Release] (describing the NSCC’s role in “accept[ing] trades . . . for clearing from exchanges and other trading venues”).
58. See id. at 1607.
59. See id. at 1575.
60. See RUBEN LEE, RUNNING THE WORLD’S MARKETS: THE GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL
INFRASTRUCTURE 22 (2011). This insulates Dealer A and Broker B from the risk of each
other’s defaults—but not, of course, from the risk that NSCC itself defaults.
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Settlement. After a trade is cleared, it is settled. Settlement refers
to the process by which securities, commodities, or money are ultimately transferred.61 In the securities markets, settlement used to involve handing over gilt-edged securities certificates.62 But no longer.
Today, nearly all corporate securities certificates are held on the
shelves of an institution called the Depository Trust Company (DTC).63
The DTC is a large safekeeping and bookkeeping operation for the securities markets.64 To settle securities trades, the NSCC computes
them and then instructs the DTC to update its books regarding who
owns an entitlement to the securities in the storehouse.65 These updates are conducted after periodic netting of transactions: if Dealer A
both buys and sells Apple stock throughout the day, it will only owe
(or be owed) a single net amount.66
Payment. Finally, in exchange for the securities transfers made on
the books of the DTC, securities market participants must make payment to the NSCC, and the NSCC must make payments to participants.67 These are not made by sending a courier across town with a
pile of greenbacks or a paper check, though they used to be.68 Instead,
at the end of each day, after netting of monetary obligations, each market participant (Dealer A, Broker B, and so on) makes or receives a
single payment to or from the NSCC.69
Reporting. The final category of the post-trade system records
and distributes data about market activity. The CAT project described

61. See PFMIS, supra note 56, at 155 (“Settlement of a trade involves the final
transfer of . . . securities . . . to the buyer (delivery) and the final transfer of funds . . . to
the seller (payment).”).
62. See JAMES STEVEN ROGERS, THE END OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS: BRINGING PAYMENT SYSTEMS LAW OUT OF THE PAST 49–53 (2012).
63. See, e.g., Geis, supra note 13, at 229.
64. See Mooney, supra note 8, at 136–38.
65. See NAT’L SEC. CLEARING CORP., RULES & PROCEDURES 76–77 (2020), http://www
.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/rules/nscc_rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F9M3-VY5E].
66. The Continuous Net Settlement System, DTCC, https://www.dtcc.com/clearing
-services/equities-clearing-services/cns [https://perma.cc/ZGK3-PJAY] (stating that
the NSCC’s Continuous Net Settlement system “settles trades from the nation’s major
exchanges, markets and other sources and nets these transactions to one security position per Member per day”).
67. See generally NAT’L SEC. CLEARING CORP., supra note 65.
68. See Conti-Brown & Wishnick, supra note 7, at 390.
69. This is done over the Federal Reserve’s large-value payment system, Fedwire.
See NAT’L SEC. CLEARING CORP., supra note 65, at 190, 274–75. For background on Fedwire, see Conti-Brown & Wishnick, supra note 7, at 401.
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in the Introduction is one prominent example.70 Efforts to create similar reporting systems have proceeded across the financial markets in
recent years, and enthusiasm is on the rise.71 These systems are valuable not only because they keep market participants informed of crucial information about market conditions, but also because they help
regulators detect and respond to problematic conduct.72
Post-trade processes may not be as exciting as the trading activity
depicted in popular culture as the core of financial markets, but they
are every bit as essential. The financial default or operational breakdown of any one of the major post-trade systems in the financial markets would spell disaster for the financial system as a whole.73 Under
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, federal regulators have declared eight of
them to be “too big to fail” and are working to ensure that they remain
resilient.74
How do regulators go about that work? Much of it happens
through well-studied methods like corporate governance mandates
and regulatory monitoring.75 But regulators can also change the posttrade process and its underlying technologies at the level of design.
The next Part offers detail on such efforts.
II. REGULATING BY REENGINEERING INFRASTRUCTURE
What can regulators achieve by reengineering financial market
infrastructure? One obvious set of goals falls under the umbrella of efficiency.76 Indeed, efficiency has long been an objective of
70. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text; discussion infra Part II.B.1.
71. Much of this enthusiasm relates to the goal of crisis prevention. See infra Parts
II.B.3, IV.A.3.
72. See Ferrarini & Saguato, supra note 55, at 583 (explaining that reporting systems “make the relevant market more transparent, providing regulators with information on relevant transactions, and market participants with aggregated data on concluded deals”).
73. See, e.g., Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve as Last Resort, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 69, 75–76 (2012) (describing the “financial Armageddon” that would ensue).
74. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Financial Stability Oversight
Council Makes First Designations in Effort To Protect Against Future Financial Crises
(July 18, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
tg1645.aspx [https://perma.cc/SCR6-9XFZ].
75. See Dan Ryan, Financial Market Utilities: Is the System Safer?, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 21, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/02/
21/financial-market-utilities-is-the-system-safer [https://perma.cc/U86E-DBA3]
(describing some of these methods).
76. Under the efficiency umbrella, one goal is Coasean transaction-cost reduction.
Cf. Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55
UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2008) (calling payment costs “the ultimate transaction cost”).
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infrastructure design.77 But this Article’s focus is different. It concerns
not how infrastructure design can make financial markets more efficient, but rather how it can support efforts to regulate harmful and
risky financial activities.
A. THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSACTIONAL PLATFORMS
The relationship between financial market infrastructure design
and the regulation of undesirable financial activities is perhaps not obvious. Most thought on how to regulate market activity centers on human actors: the rule-writers, supervisors, compliance officers, normsentrepreneurs, and gatekeepers who govern the financial sector
through their actions.78 But sometimes, regulation does not rely only
on supervisors and gatekeepers: it relies on cameras and gates. I argue
that the design of financial market infrastructure exerts a governing
force on market behavior akin to a set of cameras and gates. This force
makes reengineering a valuable tool in the financial regulation toolkit.
To elucidate the regulatory role played by infrastructure design,
it is useful to draw on work in legal theory dealing with what Lawrence Lessig has characterized as society’s “architecture”—the durable environments within which action takes shape.79 The animating
insight of this work holds that society’s architecture governs behavior
alongside other, better-studied forces and therefore deserves to be
taken seriously as a kind of clandestine regulator.80 The particular
methods through which architecture governs behavior are quite different from its peers. While law classically works through conduct
rules backed by state violence, norms work through social sanction,
and markets work through prices, architecture governs by “creat[ing]
the parameters of action” in the first place.81 Seeing how it operates
alongside those other regulatory forces reveals its surprising power.
Another is market efficiency, defined as the ability of a market to “incorporate [material information] into the price[]” of financial assets “without delay.” Burton G. Malkiel,
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSPS. 59, 59 (2003).
77. See, e.g., Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,497 (June 29, 2005) (discussing efficiency justifications for changes to securities market infrastructure); Jill M.
Considine, Designing and Building a New Securities Landscape: Customers as Architects,
22 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 423, 428 (2003) (describing efficiency as a motivation
for the formation of the DTC and NSCC). For a theoretical account of pervasive blocks
to efficiency in the evolution of market infrastructure, see Kathryn Judge, Intermediary
Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (2015).
78. See generally BARR ET AL., supra note 1 (providing a survey of the field).
79. Lessig, supra note 20, at 665–66.
80. See generally Lessig, supra note 20.
81. Amy Kapczynski, The Law of Informational Capitalism, 129 YALE L.J. 1460,
1471 (2020); see also Lessig, supra note 20, at 665–66.
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To fix the conceptual differences between the forces, consider
how each of them governed market participants in the trading pits at
the Chicago Board of Trade circa the turn of the millennium. Participants’ entry to the pits was governed by market forces (the price of a
seat) and law (membership rules).82 Once inside, their behavior was
governed by more law (conduct rules)83 and by norms (reciprocity,
retaliation).84 Crucially for our purposes, it was also governed by multiple types of Lessigian architecture. Straightforwardly, the octagonal,
bowl-shaped design of the pit created a kind of panopticon for traders.85 This design made most on-site actions visible to market participants and regulators alike and thereby disciplined traders’ behavior.86
Less straightforwardly, the protocols used to communicate and memorialize deals also constituted a kind of Lessigian architecture. These
included an open-outcry method of establishing trades and carboncopy memorialization cards to be processed by legions of clerks.87
Each of these elements affected the trading environment, determining
who could deal with whom easily, how quickly trades could be made,
what information was reliable or less reliable, and who saw what. In
the words of Caitlin Zaloom, those elements combined to “define the
actions that [could] happen” at the Chicago Board of Trade and also
“define[d] the actions that . . . must happen there to produce successful
deals.”88 They regulated action by constituting the very environment
in which it could be conducted.
To describe a physical trading pit circa 1999 is, of course, to imply
that market technology can be reengineered. By now, physical buildings and paper transactional systems have been near-completely replaced by cyberspace architecture—what Lessig called “West Coast
code.”89 Private interests often drove that reengineering process. But
in the cases that follow, public regulators played leading roles.

82. See CME GRP., CBOT RULEBOOK §§ 100–195, https://www.cmegroup.com/
rulebook/CBOT.
83. See id. §§ 500–590.
84. See ZALOOM, supra note 44, at 99–100.
85. See DONALD MACKENZIE, AN ENGINE, NOT A CAMERA: HOW FINANCIAL MODELS
SHAPE MARKETS 15 (2006).
86. See id.; cf. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT
AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 1–33, 180 (2011) (characterizing the Chicago Board
of Trade as a “disciplinary mechanism” and reflecting on the role of market surveillance in creating the conditions for disciplined behavior).
87. See MACKENZIE, supra note 85, at 58, 61.
88. ZALOOM, supra note 44, at 26.
89. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 72 (2006).
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B. THREE EXAMPLES
1. The DTC: Structural Constraints on Securities Theft
Law and regulation prohibit many forms of market misconduct,
from price manipulation to insider trading.90 Usually, these prohibited
acts are deterred by public enforcement and quelled by corporate
compliance efforts.91 But sometimes, the design of financial market infrastructure can also prevent them. To illustrate this possibility—and
to introduce the role of regulators in affirmatively pursuing it—this
Part considers a multi-decade SEC effort to constrain brokers and
clerks from stealing customers’ securities.
When the SEC was formed in 1934, and for more than three decades thereafter, Wall Street operated a “paper-based system of securities transfers.”92 Because the possession of paper certificates was evidence of securities ownership, these certificates had to be physically
transferred, “pass[ing] from seller to buyer like the deed to a house or
title to a car.”93 This system made it surprisingly easy for brokers and
clerks to misappropriate customers’ securities.
The problem first came into public view in 1938 with a “shocking” Wall Street scandal.94 In this scandal, a former president of the
NYSE named Richard Whitney was caught using his customers’ securities to serve as collateral for his own loans.95 He was able to commit
this act—a felony, for which he went to prison—because of his nearunilateral control over customers’ certificates.96
90. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i–78j (prohibiting various forms of securities manipulation).
91. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., HILLARY A. SALE & CHARLES K. WHITEHEAD, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1187–288 (14th ed. 2021).
92. James Steven Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 1431, 1447 (1996).
93. Geis, supra note 13, at 232; see also Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 307 (1990) (describing the ways in which the commercial-law regime applicable to securities at the time was “cut from the familiar fabric of
property law”).
94. MALCOLM MACKAY, IMPECCABLE CONNECTIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF RICHARD
WHITNEY 11 (2011); see also id. (quoting the society column of the New York Daily News
as stating, “Not in our time, in our father’s time, nor in our grandfather’s time has there
been such a social debacle”).
95. See Karen Patton Seymour, Securities and Financial Regulation in the Second
Circuit, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 228 (2016).
96. See Michael Beschloss, From White Knight to Thief, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/upshot/from-white-knight-to-thief.html
[https://perma.cc/F9RG-A7MF] (describing Whitney’s criminal sentence); infra notes
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In response to the Whitney scandal, then-SEC Chairman William
O. Douglas proposed a comprehensive reengineering of Wall Street’s
system for securities clearing and settlement.97 His plan called for the
development of a “brokers’ trust company,” which would centralize all
settlement activities.98 The institution Douglas envisioned looked, in
many ways, like the modern-day DTC, described above in Part I.B.
Though Douglas simultaneously pushed for legalistic reforms to curb
abuses—heightened oversight responsibilities for the NYSE, increased enforcement efforts by the SEC99—it was the infrastructural
proposal that Douglas most favored. His SEC argued that the physical
separation of brokers from customers’ securities would “obviate the
need” for much regulation100 because, as he put it, the very structure
of the system would “reduc[e] or eliminat[e]” the risk of Whitney-style
theft.101 Douglas’s SEC pushed hard for industry adoption of the proposal, but the effort went dormant once Douglas was appointed to the
Supreme Court.102
97, 113–17 and accompanying text (describing the importance of the paper certificate
to securities theft).
97. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 176–77 (3d ed.
2003).
98. Id. Indeed, the central institution Douglas proposed went even further; in his
sketch, it would control all “receipts and deliveries of securities, receipts and payments
of cash, the obtaining of credit for security purchases, [and] clearing of securities.” Id.
at 177 (internal quotation marks omitted). This idea had technical and institutional
components. At the technical level, the trust institution would enact a physical separation between brokers and their customers’ assets and rely on book-entry registration
procedures. See SEC, DRAFT REPORT ON NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF RICHARD WHITNEY & CO. 14 (1938), http://www.sechistorical.org/
collection/papers/1930/1938_0921_SECWhitneyT.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CA7
-9M9Q] (describing how the trust idea would undermine “the freedom with which customers’ money and securities can be used by the broker for his own purposes” by separating the broker from them entirely). At the institutional level, the trust would be
structured to ensure dutiful care of those assets and would also simplify the transactional and bookkeeping activities involved in clearing and settling trades. See 1 SEC, IN
THE MATTER OF RICHARD WHITNEY ET AL., REPORT ON INVESTIGATION 172 (1938) [hereinafter SEC WHITNEY REPORT VOL. 1] (describing reductions of transaction-cost “overhead,”
costs of resolving broker-dealer bankruptcies, and the “safeguards” attendant to the
trust as an entity form).
99. See SELIGMAN, supra note 97, at 163–72 (describing proposed reforms to NYSE
rules and public regulations).
100. SEC WHITNEY REPORT VOL. 1, supra note 98.
101. William O. Douglas, Chairman, SEC, Address at the Dinner of the Association
of Stock Exchange Firms 6 (May 20, 1938), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1938/
052038douglas.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9CX-ZMKG].
102. See Norman S. Poser, Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against Regulation, 3
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 289, 291–92 (2009).
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The SEC returned to Douglas’s idea for a centralized trust institution in the 1960s, most famously to cut the transaction costs associated with rising trading volumes, but also in part because it could help
curb securities theft at the level of architecture.
Securities theft had become an increasing problem in the late
1960s because of an episode known as the “Paperwork Crisis.”103
Trading volumes were swiftly rising on the stock market; so much
stock was being traded that the paper-transfer system simply broke
down.104 Brokers’ back-office operations could not “locate, process,
and move certificates fast enough” to keep up with the pace of trading.105 The NYSE began closing on Wednesdays to focus on paperwork,106 but even this stopgap was not enough. Brokerage firms increasingly failed to honor their settlement commitments to each
other.107 As the paper piled up, accounting discrepancies and outright
thefts of certificates mounted.108 In particular, organized crime operations began exploiting the “chaos” of the Paperwork Crisis “to dip
into the securities till.”109 All told, securities worth over $400 million
were stolen in 1969 and 1970 alone.110 Due to all this, many brokerage
firms were nearing or falling into insolvency, and something had to
give.111
What gave was the old, paper-based settlement system. In its
place, the SEC prodded Wall Street’s leading firms to develop the DTC.
Later, this Article will discuss the tactics that the SEC used to lead the
reengineering effort.112 But for now, it is important to focus on what
the SEC aimed to achieve. In addition to speeding up the settlement
process (something again on the table today), the effort aimed to make
securities heists much more difficult to carry out.113

103. See generally Wells, supra note 24 (describing the Paperwork Crisis).
104. See id. at 200–07.
105. Id. at 203.
106. See id. at 204, 207–08.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 206; Richard E. Rustin, Securities-Theft Flurry Prompts Insurers To
Mull Halting Coverage on Such Losses, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1969, at 2.
109. Rustin, supra note 108.
110. See Geis, supra note 13, at 232 (citing congressional testimony of U.S. Attorney
General John Mitchell).
111. See Wells, supra note 24, at 203–07.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 252–57.
113. SEC, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS, H.R.
DOC. NO. 92-231, at 44–45 (1971). For discussion of today’s settlement process, see
infra Part IV.A.1.
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The effort illustrates the value of architectural regulation in the
financial sector. It was well-known at the time that organized crime
operations were exploiting the paper-based settlement system; as a
result, reducing the use of paper certificates could help undermine
those preconditions.114 This is exactly what the DTC reengineering effort achieved. As one insider explained to Congress in 1973, the DTC
design “reduce[d] the chance for securities theft and counterfeiting
operations” in multiple ways.115 First, it “reduce[d] the number of locations in which securities [we]re held,” resulting in “fewer locations
to guard and examine.”116 Second, it “reduce[d] the number of securities movements . . . necessary to transact business,” resulting in “fewer
shipments of securities to guard and examine.”117 Third, it “reduce[d]
the physical size of the inventory that [wa]s necessary to transact securities business,” resulting in “fewer [certificates] . . . to guard and examine.”118 In essence, the DTC’s operational design itself curbed the
ability of insiders to steal customers’ securities.
In this way, the DTC functions as what one theorist of architectural regulation, Edward Cheng, has called a “structural constraint.”
Structural constraint exists wherever architecture “prevent[s] undesirable activity in the first place by making it more difficult” or impossible to undertake.119 In the realm of the built environment, structural
constraints are everywhere. From guardrails that prevent traffic collisions to bank vaults that prevent robberies, physical architecture
controls what is possible or impossible, difficult or easy within an environment.120 The same is true of the code-defined architecture of cyberspace, which enables and disables various forms of online
114. See Matthew G. Yeager, The Gangster as White Collar Criminal: Organized
Crime and Stolen Securities, 8 ISSUES CRIMINOLOGY 49, 60 (1973).
115. Organized Crime, Securities: Thefts and Frauds: Hearings Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations (Part 4), 93d Cong. 555,
556 (1974) (statement of Frank W. Kastner, Senior Vice President, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. of New York).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 556–57; see also id. at 623 (statement of Donald L. Calvin, Vice President,
New York Stock Exchange) (stating that the DTC “reduces both the opportunity for
theft and the possibility of loss”).
119. Cheng, supra note 21, at 664.
120. Cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1067–
68 (2002) (discussing bank design). The fact that structural constraint is effective says
nothing, of course, of whether a particular constraint ought to be celebrated or condemned. See, e.g., Schindler, supra note 20 (showing how urban built environments in
the United States are replete with structural constraints that wrongfully segregate and
exclude citizens from civic life).

2021]

REENGINEERING FINANCIAL MARKETS

2399

interaction.121 No matter where one looks, architecture in this broad
sense—the durable elements of “the world as [we] find it”—creates
the conditions of social possibility and also operates as a form of social
control.122 Here, it shows up in a system for securities holding and settlement.
2. CLS Bank: Network Architecture and Settlement Risk
Strategic risk-taking is at the very core of financial activity. But
not all risk-taking is socially beneficial. In particular, one class of
risks—systemic risks—are potentially harmful to public welfare because they threaten to undermine the stability of the financial system.123 To rein them in, financial regulators can use a range of approaches. They might forbid certain firms from participating in
certain financial markets, or they might prohibit certain financial
products from being bought and sold in the first place.124 But as with
plainly wrongful securities theft, regulators can also turn to the design
of financial market infrastructure.
To show how financial risk-taking can be constrained by infrastructure design, this Part describes the construction of an international payment system, called CLS Bank, and the role of the Federal
Reserve in making it happen.
Foreign exchange markets enable participants to trade one currency for another. The rise of today’s high-volume, telecommunication-based foreign exchange market began in the early 1970s.125 But,
as with the stock market situation described in Part II.B.1, back-office
121. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 89; Christopher S. Yoo, Modularity Theory and Internet Regulation, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 47–48 (evaluating how the Internet Protocol
suite both favors and disfavors different potential Internet applications).
122. Lessig, supra note 20, at 663.
123. See generally Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” in Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1093–112 (2015) (delving into the concept of financial stability and its policy implications); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk,
97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008) (setting out the policy rationale for systemic risk regulation).
124. See, e.g., ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR., TAMING THE MEGABANKS: WHY WE NEED A NEW
GLASS-STEAGALL ACT (2021) (arguing for a renewed separation of commercial banking
from investment banking); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to 21st Century Financial Markets, 107 NW.
U. L. REV. 1307 (2013) (arguing for a regulatory preapproval screen for derivatives innovations based on the insurable interest doctrine); Saule T. Omarova, License To Deal:
Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 68–84
(2012) (arguing for a preapproval regime for complex financial products).
125. See generally Catherine R. Schenk, Summer in the City: Banking Failures of
1974 and the Development of International Banking Supervision, 129 ENG. HIST. REV.
1129, 1131–33 (2014) (describing the rise of the foreign exchange market).
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settlement practices for foreign exchange were not well-matched to
the pace of growth in front-office trading.126
The first signs of serious design problems arose when losses by a
now-infamous market participant, the high-risk Bankhaus Herstatt of
Cologne, West Germany, plunged the bank into insolvency.127 When it
failed, Herstatt had a huge volume of “open” foreign exchange transactions.128 For instance, its U.S. correspondent, Chase Manhattan
Bank, had received currency from Herstatt’s counterparties for a day’s
worth of trades, but—to the tune of $3.3 billion in today’s dollarequivalents—had conservatively refused to make the quid pro quo
payments.129 Banks exposed to losses from Herstatt’s defaults scrambled to avoid defaulting on their own obligations, and the market as a
whole suffered a contraction of short-term credit.130 Even once the
126. To clear and settle their foreign exchange transactions in the early 1970s,
dealers active in the market would contract with a network of correspondent banks
with access to the major wholesale payment systems for each of the currencies they
traded. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons
Taught by Herstatt and Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3, 5 n.23 (1977) (describing Herstatt’s local correspondent relationships). In essence, a promise of delivery of dollars
on the books of the Federal Reserve would be consideration for a promise of delivery
of yen on the books of the Bank of Japan or pounds on the books of the Bank of England.
These would be effectuated via payments on each country’s local large-value payment
system to the correspondents. See id.
127. See DAVID ZARING, THE GLOBALIZED GOVERNANCE OF FINANCE 4 (2020) (describing the Herstatt bankruptcy as a “systemic failure that rippled through the global economy”); CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE
21ST CENTURY 77–79 (2015) (linking the Herstatt episode to the origins of the Basel
regime); Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, ‘Trust Is Good, Control Is Better’: The 1974 Herstatt
Bank Crisis and Its Implications for International Regulatory Reform, 57 J. BUS. HIST. 311,
313 (2015); Joseph D. Becker, International Insolvency: The Case of Herstatt, 62 A.B.A.
J. 1290, 1291 (1976) (describing Herstatt as “living off its foreign exchange earnings”);
Richard Herring, International Financial Conglomerates: Implications for Bank Insolvency Regimes, in MARKET DISCIPLINE IN BANKING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 99, 101 (George
G. Kaufman ed., 2003) (describing Herstatt as “notorious among market practitioners
for . . . taking foreign exchange positions that were very large relative to its capital”).
128. See Mourlon-Druol, supra note 127, at 316.
129. See Schenk, supra note 125, at 1139 (stating that Chase “was caught with
about $620m of transfers due to customers on account of Herstatt”); CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm
(last visited Apr. 11, 2021) (used to calculate the value of $620 million June 1974 dollars in terms of February 2021 dollars). For the upshot of one counterparty’s grievances, see Delbrueck & Co. v. Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co., 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1979).
130. See generally Richard Herring, The Challenge of Resolving Cross-Border Financial Institutions, 31 YALE J. ON REGUL. 853, 863–64 (2014) (“Herstatt also made clear
that the impact of the failure of even a small bank can be amplified if it interrupts an
important clearing and settlement process. In this case, the dollar/deutsche mark market, at the time the largest foreign exchange market in the world, came to a virtual halt
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acute panic subsided, sorting out who owed what to whom was herculean work for the bankruptcy courts, and the confusions surrounding it prompted attempts at reform.131
But despite international regulatory attention, settlement risk
continued to create problems throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century. In 1990, when leading Wall Street investment bank
Drexel Burnham Lambert Group filed for bankruptcy, many parties
ceased patterns of regular transacting out of fear they would be stuck
in essentially the situation of Herstatt’s uncompensated counterparties.132 And a year later, in 1991, the liquidation of the Luxembourgian
Bank of Commerce and Credit International left several its foreign exchange counterparties in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Japan uncompensated in open foreign exchange transactions.133 Regulators, including the Federal Reserve, increasingly searched for new
ways to risk-proof the foreign exchange settlement system.
The push gained force in 1996 when an international consortium
of regulators called the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems announced a position that central banks like the Fed should take
affirmative measures to “induce private sector progress” in reducing
settlement risk.134 Some of these measures were traditional, nuts-andbolts risk regulation. For instance, regulators imposed “tough risk
control” rules and standards backed by the threat of legal sanctions.135
But they also pushed the leading international participants in the foreign exchange market to build a new payment system that met the
regulators’ specifications.
The result was a major international success: a technologically
advanced system that eliminated Herstatt risk entirely for those who

for more than a month until the authorities and the New York Clearing House could
restore confidence.”).
131. See generally Schenk, supra note 125 (describing the bankruptcy cases and
the Herstatt crisis’s role in prompting financial regulatory reforms, including the
founding of the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision).
132. See Herring, supra note 127, at 105–07.
133. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, SETTLEMENT RISK IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 7 (1996), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d17.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K73
-2W8X].
134. See Alexandra Schaller, Continuous Linked Settlement: History and Implications 44, 47–48 (Dec. 5, 2007) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Zurich), https://www
.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/163690/1/20080261.pdf [https://perma.cc/96WD-L5LY].
135. Jeffrey M. Lacker, The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? A Comment, 54 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONF. SERIES ON PUB. POL’Y 227,
229 (2001).
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use it.136 The system is called CLS Bank, for its “continuous linked settlement” technology. It reveals how infrastructure design can obviate
certain forms of financial risk-taking.
CLS Bank transforms the previously risky business of foreign exchange settlement into a process where settlement risk has been eliminated. It does so first through a fundamental change to the foreign
exchange network topology. Because CLS Bank itself holds accounts at
the Fed and sixteen other central banks in countries where its members trade currency, it acts as the central payor and payee for every
foreign exchange transaction that its members undertake.137 Second,
in addition to being central payor and payee, CLS Bank also is designed
to render unfunded transactions impossible within its software.138 As
a result, each transaction is settled on a “payment versus payment”
basis.139 This design completely eliminates the risk of the one-way delivery that accompanies Herstatt-style transactions.140
3. The Fourteen Families: Visibility and Counterparty Risk
In addition to imposing structural constraints on undesirable behavior and reorganizing network topology, reengineering efforts can
also affect what types of information are visible within firms, horizontally across markets, and vertically by regulators. The major determinants of visibility are not limited to disclosure rules and supervisory
powers; they also include the data standards and technologies
136. See CLS GRP., INTRODUCTION TO CLS 4 (2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/
medialibrary/media/banking/international/14-CLS-2015-Kos-Puth.pdf [https://
perma.cc/R96E-WYRK] (stating that CLS Bank was “[c]reated as a result of regulatory
concern regarding the potential for FX settlement risk to be a major source of systemic
risk”).
137. See David Humphrey, Payments and Payment Systems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 423 (Allen N. Berger, Philip Molyneux & John O.S. Wilson eds., 2d ed.
2015) (“CLS is open simultaneously, in all the countries whose currency it trades, for
approximately five hours during the day with final settlement through CLS accounts it
holds with the central banks of the traded currencies. Member banks each have a multicurrency account with CLS and make payments into these accounts to cover the
trades they wish to make. The trades are transacted by simultaneously debiting the
account of the bank in the currency being sold, and crediting the account of another
bank in the currency being purchased. Trades take place if, and only if, both sides of
the trade successfully complete all the requirements of the payment.”).
138. See Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks
of International Payments Settlement?, 54 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONF. SERIES ON PUB.
POL’Y 192, 208 (2001).
139. Id. at 197.
140. Id.; see also David F. DeRosa, Sponsored Transactional Patterns: Comments on
Mehrling’s Essential Hybridity: A Money View of FX, 41 J. COMPAR. ECON. 364, 366
(2013) (describing the resulting payments as “better than gold”).
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employed to organize and distribute information about market activity in the first place.141 These elements of the financial markets’ West
Coast code have gained prominence in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, and they present an important frontier for regulatory leadership in the future.
To understand why, consider an episode involving the credit derivatives markets. While the legal literature contains much engagement with post-Global Financial Crisis mandatory central counterparty clearing,142 this episode comes from the pre-Crisis era. As
students of the Crisis well know, these markets were burgeoning prior
to 2008.143 But their post-trade systems remained stuck in the 1990s.
In a typical pre-Crisis credit default swap transaction,144 two parties
to a trade handled all post-trade processes bilaterally.145 Until 2005,
traders and their clerks still recorded their agreed-upon transactions
by hand and faxed them to their counterparties.146
As the market grew, the back-office state of affairs worsened. For
a large set of derivatives trades, parties left those faxed details unconfirmed for months at a time.147 Parties were left in the dark about the
assignment of their trades to third parties.148 In the event of insolvency of one of the major market participants—and there would be
141. On the role of data standards in financial regulation, see Richard Berner &
Kathryn Judge, The Data Standardization Challenge, in SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE FINANCIAL
SECTOR: TEN YEARS AFTER THE GREAT CRASH 135 (Douglas W. Arner, Emilios Avgouleas,
Danny Busch & Steven L. Schwarcz eds., 2019).
142. See, e.g., Yesha Yadav, Clearinghouses and the Swaps Market: A Decade On, in
OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 1 (2019).
143. See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A
Case Study in Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639, 640 (2010) (“When the
credit crisis struck in the fall of 2008, there were $57 trillion in outstanding notional
amount of CDS. In each of the preceding three years, the amount of CDS had nearly
doubled. In 2004, positions in CDS stood at $4.5 trillion.” (footnotes omitted)).
144. “In simple terms, a credit default swap is a promise by one party to pay another party in the event that a third party defaults on its debt.” Jeremy C. Kress, Credit
Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must
Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49, 52 (2011). The promisor
is known as a “protection seller,” and the promisee is known as a “protection buyer.”
Id. Over the course of the transaction, the protection buyer makes periodic payments
to the protection seller, who bears the risk of owing the buyer a lump payment in the
event of third-party default. Id.
145. See Chander & Costa, supra note 143, at 649–51.
146. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-716, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: CONFIRMATION BACKLOGS INCREASED DEALERS’ OPERATIONAL RISKS, BUT WERE SUCCESSFULLY ADDRESSED AFTER JOINT REGULATORY ACTION 12 (2007); TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST:
REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 102 (2014).
147. See sources cited supra note 146.
148. See sources cited supra note 146.
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one such insolvency during the Crisis, along with many near-insolvencies only avoided by extraordinary governmental intervention149—
the other participants would have had no idea of their exposures.
Regulators at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (New York
Fed) and the SEC engaged in close collaboration with the major market participants, known colloquially as “the Fourteen Families,” to
clear the fog.150 Specifically, the regulators pressured the Fourteen
Families to act using the powers of supervisory oversight and moral
suasion.151 In response, the Fourteen Families reduced trade-confirmation backlogs, adopted technical standards for computerized tradetracking, and adopted protocols to ensure awareness of third-party
assignments.152 Through a new platform called Deriv/SERV, they collectively automated many aspects of the information-distribution process.153
This reengineering of the derivatives post-trade process proved
to be crucial. Had this paper-and-fax system remained in place, the
confusion it created would have worsened the eventual crisis.154 As
Tim Geithner, who had been the President of the New York Fed at the
time, put it, “In a crisis, nobody would have [had] any idea who owed
what to whom, or whether whoever owed it would be able to pay.”155

149. Of the fourteen major market participants at the time, Lehman Brothers
would fail, while Bear Stearns, Credit Suisse, Citigroup, UBS, Merrill Lynch, and Wachovia were only saved by massive support from the Fed and the Swiss National Bank.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 146, at 11 n.16 (listing the fourteen dominant credit derivatives dealers); ADAM TOOZE, CRASHED: HOW A DECADE OF FINANCIAL CRISES CHANGED THE WORLD 177–78, 181–85, 220–23 (2018) (describing the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers and the government support that averted the bankruptcies of Bear
Stearns, Credit Suisse, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, and UBS).
150. See GEITHNER, supra note 146, at 103. The details of the collaborative process
are discussed infra Part III.
151. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 146.
152. Id. at 18–25.
153. See Christopher L. Culp, OTC-Cleared Derivatives: Benefits, Costs, and Implications of the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,” 20 J. APPLIED
FIN., no. 2, 2010, at 103, 109.
154. The basic mechanism of exacerbation would have been opacity about counterparty risk relationships, which would have increased the likelihood of contractions
in short-term credit and of asset fire-sales. See Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and
Shadow Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411, 457 (2017).
155. GEITHNER, supra note 146, at 103; see also Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr.,
The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1036 (2007) (discussing the downsides of market opacity).
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The extra knowledge afforded by newly-digitized clearing systems
limited the contagion of the failures that eventually did take place.156
***
These three examples are very different—in terms of policy rationale, efficacy, ease of implementation, and more. Yet, together they
show how regulators can embed policy goals into the design of market
infrastructure. They also suggest the importance of public-private
reengineering efforts within the broad set of approaches available to
regulate the financial system.
III. EVALUATING THE PRACTICE
As the theoretical discussion and case studies presented in Part
II suggest, financial regulators can leverage the design of market technology to achieve a range of policy goals. But that fact alone cannot tell
a regulator whether to pursue a reengineering effort in lieu of, or
alongside, other techniques of governance. The answer to that question will depend on the comparative advantages and disadvantages of
reengineering in a given context. This Part develops a framework for
evaluating a reengineering idea’s context-specific utility. Part A focuses on efficacy. As a technique, how effective is architectural “governance by infrastructure design”157 at achieving policy objectives
compared with direct conduct regulation or, say, the promotion of behavioral norms? Next, Part B turns to process. How should regulators
think about the pros and cons of enlisting the private sector to engage
in a reengineering effort? Finally, Part C steps back to consider systemic implications. How are individual reengineering efforts likely to
interact with the broader project of financial regulation? Taken together, answers to these questions can shed light on reengineering’s
proper place in the financial regulatory toolkit.
A. THE EFFICACY OF REGULATING THROUGH DESIGN
When pursuing policy goals, financial regulators often write rules
prohibiting harmful conduct, bring enforcement actions penalizing
rule-violations, or extol behavioral norms from the bully pulpit. Infrastructural reengineering efforts are different. They aim to change the
design elements of standardized financial platforms—elements that
156. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Dynamic Precaution” in Maintaining Financial Stability:
The Importance of FSOC, in AFTER THE CRASH: FINANCIAL CRISES AND REGULATORY RESPONSES 144 (Sharyn O’Halloran & Thomas Groll eds., 2019).
157. Cf. Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Saving Governance-by-Design, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 697, 722–38 (2018) (examining the use of technological design
as a form of governance across regulatory domains).

2406

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:2379

themselves will do the work of controlling behavior or making it susceptible to surveillance.158 To the extent that rulemaking, enforcement, or moral suasion are involved in reengineering, those tools are
used to cajole market participants into altering market infrastructure;
it is the infrastructure itself that imposes the desired governance. The
qualities associated with this mode of governance render it fit for a
range of purposes within the traditional financial regulatory ambit.
This Part draws on Part II’s cases to describe these qualities and then
assesses the tradeoffs they are likely to produce in the context of financial market infrastructure.
1. Infrastructure Design as Mechanical Governance
The most important quality of infrastructure design relates to the
way it operates on behavior. Specifically, its modes of control are mechanical. In Part II’s cases, I highlighted how the design of financial
market infrastructure can serve policy goals by imposing structural
constraints on behavior or increasing the visibility of market activity.159 Once installed, these structural constraints and surveillance
technologies operate like clockwork, “without further human intervention.”160 They operate on behavior not through ex-post enforcement but rather through ex-ante conditions that apply in an immediate and automatic way to participants in a given financial market.161
They do so because they become fixtures of the very environment
within which market activity takes place.
What does mechanical governance look like in the financial sector? The cases presented in Part II help shed light here. Though the
process of reengineering infrastructure in each case was of course anything but mechanical,162 the products now operate in a mechanical
way. First, take the way the DTC helps address securities theft. While
traditional methods of policing securities theft rely on ex-post prosecution, the central securities depository design delivers ex-ante prevention. The replacement of a decentralized, paper-based settlement
process with a centralized process relying on electronic records at the
DTC deprives would-be embezzlers of their back-office access to

158. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
159. See supra Part II.B.
160. See Grimmelmann, supra note 22, at 1723.
161. On the immediacy and automation of architectural regulation generally, see
LESSIG, supra note 89, at 236–37. On the immediacy of software, in particular, see Grimmelmann, supra note 22, at 1729–30.
162. For discussion of the process aspects of reengineering, see infra Section III.B.
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misappropriate securities certificates.163 It is the complex-systems
equivalent of a locked vault. Similarly, CLS Bank’s design removed the
ability of its users to incur Herstatt risk. A cop need not be on the beat
to ensure it; the CLS Bank system automates the payment-versus-payment requirement.164 Participants in CLS Bank could not subvert it if
they tried. Finally, consider the changes to the standard data forms
and trade-confirmation practices in the credit derivatives markets.
These changes rendered information about counterparty risk visible
internally, between firms, and to regulators. And they did so not
through the imposition of ex-post reporting requirements but rather
by changing the technical standards according to which deals are conducted in the first place. In the run-up to the Global Financial Crisis,
this had the effect of heightening private-sector and public-sector
awareness of the markets’ growing risks.165
The mechanical nature of governance-by-infrastructure-design
renders it different from other techniques of regulating financial markets along two key dimensions: its cost structure and its relationship
to bureaucratic discretion. Though these differences by no means
guarantee that reengineering ought to be employed in any particular
case, they do present a number of reasons why regulators may benefit
from pursuing it in general.
Reduced Variable Costs. The first consequence of the mechanical
nature of governance-by-infrastructure-design is that it likely will reduce the variable costs of achieving particular agency objectives when
compared with traditional regulatory techniques. In the case of securities theft, for instance, William O. Douglas saw this in the 1930s.
Though the mischief of securities theft can of course be addressed by
heightened investigation and enforcement efforts, Douglas advocated
the construction of a central securities depository to “obviate the
need” for the ongoing costs such efforts would generate.166 Similarly,
when regulators around the world considered the problem of Herstatt-style settlement risk in the foreign exchange markets, they pursued a regime of governance reforms and capital regulations that require ongoing investment and oversight to render effective.167 CLS
Bank represents an effective substitute for this regime as a method of
dealing with the particular problem of Herstatt risk. It therefore takes
163. See supra Part II.B.1.
164. See supra Part II.B.2.
165. See supra Part II.B.3.
166. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The
View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 16–17 (2006).
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one task off the plate of the financial regulatory regime when dealing
with systemic risk regulation.
Reduced variable costs are significant, of course, because agencies always select priorities in the shadow of budget constraints.168
When embedding a given priority into market infrastructure obviates
the need for ongoing rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement related to that priority, it frees up agency resources for other matters. A
Fed that worries less about Herstatt risk can devote more resources
to dealing with operational risk, for instance. This is not to say such
trades are costless. A reengineering effort may create the need for ongoing attention to a new problem—for instance, with CLS Bank or the
DTC, the problem of centralized cyber risk.169 The benefits of solving
old problems must be weighed against the costs of creating new ones
in any particular case. But just as the purchase of a sturdy bank vault
reduces the need for hired guns, reengineering efforts hold out the
promise of reducing the ongoing costs of addressing problems in the
financial sector.
The Removal of Discretion. A second quality of mechanical governance is that it eliminates human agency and discretion from a given
policy space. This is not only a potential source of cost-savings in the
budgetary sense; in some cases, it also can increase the reliability of
regulation. Most prominently, eliminating discretion can be useful in
situations where line personnel might bring in undue bias170 or might
become excessively cozy with the firms they supervise.171 For instance, one reason why it took so long to uncover the scandal of Richard Whitney’s securities thefts was that his reputation as the “white
knight” of Wall Street rendered him above suspicion.172 Regulatory
168. See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND.
L. REV. 285, 309 (2014).
169. See, e.g., JASON HEALEY, PATRICIA MOSER, KATHERYN ROSEN & ADRIANA TACHE,
BROOKINGS CYBERSECURITY PROJECT, THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY AND CYBER RISK 7,
9–10 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Healey-et
-al_Financial-Stability-and-Cyber-Risk.pdf [https://perma.cc/CXN6-LSUN]; see also infra Part III.C (discussing the systemic tradeoffs of reengineering efforts).
170. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative
Decision Making in the Machine Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017) (examining
whether “robotic” decision making tools are constitutional). But see, e.g., Danielle Keats
Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008) (arguing automated
systems jeopardize due process norms).
171. See Peter Conti-Brown, The Twelve Federal Reserve Banks: Governance and Accountability in the 21st Century 16–17 (Hutchins Ctr. on Fiscal & Monetary Pol’y at
Brookings, Working Paper No. 10, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2015/02/fed_banks_21st_century.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7BV-7L2A].
172. See Beschloss, supra note 96.
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discretion allowed him to go relatively unchecked for too long. Similarly, consider the example of CLS Bank. The pre-CLS Bank era was rife
with prudential discretion for bank supervisors over Herstatt risk.
How seriously should they view the risk? Should they penalize banks
that transact with risky counterparties? How severely? With regard to
foreign exchange settlement risk, CLS takes these questions off the table. Finally, consider the problem of regulatory access to high-quality
data about the financial markets. Such data—essential to the task of
financial crisis prevention173—might be produced post-hoc, through
periodic reporting, or might be produced by a system that is integrated with a given market’s trading operations. Only the latter will
automatically deliver timely, useful data as a matter of course, without
room for shirking by regulated firms. And the latter is what the Fourteen Families’ derivatives reengineering produced, enabling regulators and firms to obtain at least a partial handle on the risks arising in
the credit derivatives markets.174
Of course, there are also potential downsides to the absence of
discretion. A fundamental quality of traditional regulation is that its
enforcers may exercise discretion to temper the severity of any given
regulatory decree. In the context of the common law, this possibility
falls under the rubric of equity; in the context of financial regulation,
it is typically thought of as forbearance.175 Financial regulators exercise discretion against applying legal rules and standards for many
reasons—to achieve deregulatory goals, to bargain with regulated entities, or even to mitigate the effects of a crisis. Mechanical governance
takes these options off the table. Because it is automatic, no human
agent can play the role of “shield[]” between a policy and its unwise
application.176
In practice, financial regulators are likely to be capable of balancing the tradeoffs inherent in removing policy discretion fairly well.
Consider, for instance, a recent rulemaking proceeding over the design of the Federal Reserve’s large-value payment system, Fedwire.
Each day, Fedwire facilitates payment of over $4 trillion between the
banks and other financial institutions that hold money in accounts at

173. See infra Part IV.A.3.
174. See supra Part II.B.3.
175. See David Zaring, The Government’s Economic Response to the Coronavirus
Crisis 30–34 (July 28, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3662049.
176. Cohen, supra note 52, at 42.

2410

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:2379

the Federal Reserve.177 Currently, Fedwire allows those institutions to
overdraft on their account balances, leaving the Fed on the hook in the
event of default.178 To reduce its risk, the Fed can monitor account
holders’ creditworthiness, charge fees, or demand collateral.179 At
first, the Fed proposed to curb overdrafts through limits built into the
Fedwire system, making it functionally impossible for institutions to
run up their overdraft debts.180 But the pushback from Fedwire’s users was swift: they worried about the automated prohibition on overdrafts leading to gridlock in the interbank payment system.181 In some
situations, this gridlock might exacerbate a liquidity crisis.182 The Fed
evidently agreed and has backed away from its governance-by-design
proposal.
Taken from a broader perspective, the tradeoff between discretion and automation is likely to be less problematic in financial markets than in other contexts. In the context of cyberspace regulation, a
generation of scholars has lamented the costs of automatic governance by code because of its effects on the values of public discourse
and free social life.183 But rigid regulation in the financial markets has
lower stakes because the values involved are instrumental ones. Further, the parties most likely to be affected are not individual citizens
whose power is negligible but rather large financial institutions who
can push back against excessive rigidity through interest-group action. As a result, the ability of agencies to tame certain forms of line-

177. See Fedwire Funds Service - Annual Statistics, FED. RSRV. BANK SERVS., https://
www.frbservices.org/resources/financial-services/wires/volume-value-stats/
annual-stats.html [https://perma.cc/V8HX-RCBH].
178. Policy on Payment System Risk and Expanded Real-Time Monitoring, 83 Fed.
Reg. 20,074, 20,074 (2018) (“[T]he Reserve Banks could face direct risk of loss should
institutions be unable to settle their daylight overdrafts in their Federal Reserve accounts before the end of the day.”).
179. See id. For an ethnographic account of hand-wringing at the Bank of Japan regarding daylight overdrafts when it began operating a payment system similar to Fedwire, see Annelise Riles, Real Time: Unwinding Technocratic and Anthropological
Knowledge, 31 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 392 (2004).
180. See Policy on Payment System Risk and Expanded Real-Time Monitoring, 83
Fed. Reg. at 20,074–76.
181. See Letter from Alaina Gimbert, Senior Vice President & Assoc. Gen. Couns.,
The Clearing House Payments Co., to Ann E. Misback, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Rsrv. Sys. (July 6, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2018/July/
20180726/OP-1607/OP-1607_070618_132121_420589738959_1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7N4S-828F].
182. Id. at 2.
183. See, e.g., Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 157, at 701 (arguing that “governance-by-design has taken us down the path towards governance dystopia”).
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level discretion through reengineering efforts is likely to be valuable
without running amok.
2. The Durability of Infrastructure
A second important quality of design changes to financial market
infrastructure is that they are likely to be durable. The infrastructural
changes described in Part II, for instance, are between one and five
decades old at this point, but they continue to shape the path of market infrastructure development. The DTC now operates as the nearuniversal standard for securities settlement in the United States;184
CLS Bank intermediates the lion’s share of foreign exchange transactions between the jurisdictions it serves;185 and the 2005–06 data reforms laid the groundwork for the transformation of the credit derivatives markets post-2008.186
The durability of these systems can be chalked up to a combination of network effects, organizational embeddedness, and regulatory
linkages. Network effects arise because market participants have incentives to use the transactional infrastructure that gives them access
to large numbers of other market participants.187 In the context of
trading, larger networks tend to redound to greater market liquidity;188 in the context of clearing and settlement, they tend to create
benefits from transactional netting.189 While economists debate the
conditions under which these incentives contribute to inefficient lockin, in all cases network effects bind market participants to dominant
infrastructure.190 So, too, does the organizational embeddedness of
technical systems. Because technical systems require highly specialized knowledge to operate or participate in, that knowledge often
184. See Tony Porter, Technical Systems and the Architecture of Transnational Business Governance Interactions, 8 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 110, 121 (2014) (characterizing
the DTC as holding an “effective monopoly” over corporate securities settlement in the
United States).
185. See Morten Linnemann Bech & Henry Holden, FX Settlement Risk Remains Significant, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2019, at 48, 48 graph A.1 (documenting the extent of CLS’s
market share).
186. See Dan Awrey, Split Derivatives: Inside the World’s Most Misunderstood Contract, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 495, 527–29 (2019) (describing how the reforms facilitated
a range of back-office developments in subsequent years).
187. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1967 (2007) (describing the network effects tending to arise from access to markets with larger numbers of participants).
188. See id.
189. See LEE, supra note 60, at 61.
190. See Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 187.
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becomes institutionalized within particular organizational roles and
departments and routinized into organizational processes.191 Today,
entire bank departments owe their existence to the task of processing
trades through the DTC, CLS Bank, and their infrastructural peers.192
Such institutionalization tends to further entrench a given system. Finally, similar linkages between financial market infrastructure design
and regulatory regimes tend to add inertia as well. Because regulatory
rules often fit particular technical systems, regulators and compliance
professionals alike are loath to let dynamism lead to misalignment.193
These forces of durability will increase the usefulness of reengineering in situations where they wish to insulate policies against
change. When agencies pursue regulatory projects, those efforts are
always contingent. As Chris Brummer has highlighted, they can be undermined by a variety of forces, from technological dynamism to shifting market structure.194 They also face the threat of what J.B. Ruhl and
Jim Salzman have called “regulatory exit”—the “intentional, significant reduction” in a regulatory program’s vitality by agency action.195
Though some exits are planned by the authors of a program in the first
place, others represent direct affronts to the policy goals that animate
the programs. These unplanned exits may come through formal repudiation in the pages of the Federal Register; they may also come
through informal means, such as “slashing agency budgets, reassigning staff, declining to enforce a regulatory program, or seeking delays
in the courts.”196 Because agency staff typically wish to see their work
live on after their departure, they often seek ways to “insulate or
191. See Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 157, at 743 (describing how technical
systems “often become[] embedded in organizations and social structures, and in the
practices of a culture, community, or profession and then fade[] into the background”);
Porter, supra note 184 (describing the integration of the financial markets’ technical
systems into organizational routines and professional identity).
192. See, e.g., Broker-Dealers, BNY MELLON, https://www.bnymellon.com/us/en/
solutions/broker-dealers/overview.html [https://perma.cc/9C9Y-4KXK]; State Street
Global Services, STATE ST., https://www.statestreet.com/solutions/by-capability/ssgs
.html [https://perma.cc/E2FV-JMNZ]. For an ethnographic account of these departments, see KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET 73–121 (2009),
which describes the “back office” departments of Wall Street firms.
193. See HO, supra note 192 (arguing that regulatory governance regimes tend to
be complementary to, and integrated with, technical systems in the financial sector).
194. See Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 1020–35 (2015) (analyzing how disruptive information and communications technology can undermine otherwise-settled regulatory practices and regimes).
195. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulatory Exit, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1302
(2015).
196. Sarah E. Light, Regulatory Horcruxes, 67 DUKE L.J. 1647, 1650 (2018).
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harden” their favored projects against exit by their successors.197 Due
to the durability provided by network effects, organizational embeddedness, and regulatory linkages, infrastructural reengineering is
likely to be effective at providing just such insulation.
Of course, there are downsides to this kind of entrenchment, too.
Embedding regulatory values into market infrastructure may lead to
harmful protectionism by dominant players in transactional networks. Reengineering efforts risk producing this effect because they
may give rise to strong industry coalitions. These coalitions—take, for
instance, the broker-dealers and custodians that control the DTC—
may gain positional power due to their newfound centrality in financial intermediation chains, and they also may hold sway with regulators due to their value as partners in the reengineering effort.
As Kathryn Judge has written, when intermediaries possess such
advantages, they generally seek to “affect the processes through
which institutions evolve in self-serving ways.”198 Because the
(newly) existing infrastructure design will favor their business models, they will take concerted action to maintain the (new) status quo.
In her account of this process of “intermediary influence,” Judge
shows how securities firms with control over the NYSE successfully
resisted efficiency-enhancing changes to tick size for many years
through effective collective action.199 A similar process of intermediary entrenchment has played out over multiple decades in the case of
the DTC. While scholars and policymakers intermittently lament flaws
with the DTC model from the perspective of intermediary risk, corporate voting, and more, the model has gone untouched by serious competitive disruption or regulatory upheaval since its creation half a century ago.
Does the DTC’s problematic entrenchment reveal that it was a
fundamental mistake to prod its construction? Though this is perhaps
the view of some commentators,200 I do not think so. The myriad problems that converged in the Paperwork Crisis were themselves
longstanding, as evidenced by the 1930s SEC’s interest in resolving
them, and later in the early-1960s SEC’s similar interest.201 The infrastructural solution mitigated these problems for the long haul. Indeed,
the DTC, along with CLS Bank and other important infrastructure
197. See id.
198. Judge, supra note 77, at 577.
199. See id. at 594–96.
200. See, e.g., David C. Donald, Heart of Darkness: The Problem at the Core of the U.S.
Proxy System and Its Solution, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 41, 82–94 (2011).
201. See supra Part II.B.1.
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institutions, continued normal business even amid the stress of the
Global Financial Crisis, becoming widely lauded as the few large, systemically important “dog[s] that didn’t bark.”202 While scholars might
debate whether this or that design would have been better to promote
in the late 1960s, the general effort to produce the DTC was a valuable
one. Similarly, though CLS Bank and ongoing derivatives reforms have
undoubtedly strengthened the competitive positions of their insiders,
this fact alone cannot motivate a wholesale indictment of those efforts.
Instead, in any particular case, regulators and scholars must balance
the weight of entrenchment against the governance benefits of reengineering.
B. THE CHALLENGE OF PRIVATE-SECTOR ENLISTMENT
The prior Part looked at the characteristics that make reengineering useful as a technique of governance and the tradeoffs those
characteristics produce. This Part turns to process considerations. In
particular, it highlights a second set of reasons regulators might wish
to consider reengineering efforts: they can leverage private-sector capacity to serve public-law goals.
Across the cases presented in Part II, regulators relied heavily on
private actors for both idea formation and blueprint implementation.
They drew on extensive industry knowledge and detailed understandings of market dynamics.203 In the case of what became the DTC, William O. Douglas first developed the idea based on a proposal circulating in the stock-brokerage industry.204 Eventually, the DTC was built
by a consortium of brokerage houses in cooperation with a team
within the NYSE.205 Similarly, CLS Bank’s development occurred at the
behest of central banks around the world, but the effort was carried
out by a private-sector “G20” of the world’s largest foreign exchange
dealer banks and eventually implemented through a technology
202. Gordon, supra note 156, at 148; see also SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 54, at
792 (noting that the infrastructure of financial markets “performed well during the
financial crisis that began in 2007”).
203. The value of such detailed and “context-specific” industrial knowledge is discussed in Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 27–28 (2008). See also Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert
B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 614–15 (2010)
(justifying agency independence on the ground that it facilitates invaluable public-private collaboration).
204. See Douglas, supra note 101, at 6 (stating that the central depository trust idea
“emanate[d] from the brokerage business itself” and “was suggested [in the United
States] at least as [early] as 1932”).
205. See Donald, supra note 200, at 54–59.
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services contract with IBM.206 And with credit derivatives reform, the
idea took shape due to an “early warning” provided by an industry actor, who told the president of the New York Fed about the risks posed
by the dated practices of the derivatives post-trade process.207 In light
of those risks, the Fourteen Families engaged in coordination and
standardization efforts over the course of multiple years to meet regulators’ requirements for transparent post-trade practices.208
The advantages to regulators of working with private actors to
achieve public ends come not only in the forms of local knowledge and
specialized expertise but also in the simple form of resources. While
public monitoring and enforcement require large budget allocations,209 the act of leveraging private-sector capacity only costs the
regulator the price of the leverage.210 By using the ability to both coordinate and coerce industry actors to make infrastructural changes,
regulators who lead reengineering efforts are able to take action even
if they are severely under-resourced in the budgetary sense.211
In each of these regards, reengineering efforts resemble other
methods of financial regulation that enlist private-sector actors to do
the work of the state, from self-regulation to gatekeeping regimes.212
Like those better-studied methods of collaborative governance, reengineering will only succeed in contexts where regulators are able to
work effectively across the public-private divide without succumbing
to capture or capriciousness. On this front, it is essential to evaluate
whether the legal and bureaucratic structures through which the
206. See Schaller, supra note 134.
207. NOAM SCHEIBER, THE ESCAPE ARTISTS: HOW OBAMA’S TEAM FUMBLED THE RECOVERY 210 (2012) (citing an interview with a New York Fed official). That this industry
actor, a Goldman Sachs partner named Gerald Corrigan, had only recently passed
through the revolving door from the Federal Reserve to Goldman perhaps suggests
why his warnings were both credible and effective. See id.
208. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 146, at 18–25.
209. See Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers, 106
VA. L. REV. 467, 509–10 (2019).
210. Cf. William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Regulatory Leveraging: Problem or
Solution?, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1163, 1165–66 (2016) (discussing private sector leveraging).
211. Cf. Van Loo, supra note 209, at 510–11 (describing how regulators “can dramatically expand the administrative state’s regulatory workforce” by conscripting
large firms to police their suppliers); Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party
Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 23 (2012) (identifying similar advantages to third-party
verification regimes).
212. See, e.g., Bressman & Thompson, supra note 203, at 637–38 (describing SEC
reliance on self-regulation); Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangells, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797, 802–03 (2016) (evaluating the enlistment of financial
institutions as quasi-gatekeepers in anti-money laundering regimes).
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agencies are “regulating architecture to regulate behavior”213 are sufficient to prevent those unwanted outcomes.
1. The Utility of Coordination
For a reengineering effort to succeed, regulators must usually facilitate private-sector coordination of some kind. Coordination occurs
when industry actors undertake a joint course of action to solve a
shared problem.214 Regulatory facilitation of industry coordination is
a common enterprise, and it occupies a core place in discourse about
the public-private interface.215 It was instrumental to the reengineering efforts profiled in Part II.
At the most basic level, industry coordination can serve public
purposes by bringing local industry knowledge and concerted industry action to bear on a given problem. Regulators can facilitate this
through simple acts like convening key industry actors together in one
location and setting an agenda for them.216 The value of even small
coordinating actions like this can be seen in the cases. For instance, in
2005, when the New York Fed realized that the credit derivatives market’s antiquated back-office systems could cause major problems, they
called an ad-hoc meeting with the Fourteen Families.217 Gathering in
the New York Fed’s dining room, the representatives of the Families
discussed how best to mutually adopt new, digital post-trade

213. Lessig, supra note 20, at 668.
214. Cf. Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game
Theory, and the Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 219 (2009) (“[G]enerally, the problem of
coordination arises where two or more individuals can reach some mutually desired
outcome—or avoid some mutually undesired outcome—only by combining their actions in a certain way, but where more than one possible combination will suffice. The
presence of multiple ways to combine actions requires that individuals coordinate on
the same combination.” (emphasis omitted)).
215. See, e.g., Annelise Riles, Is New Governance the Ideal Architecture for Global
Financial Regulation?, in CENTRAL BANKING AT A CROSSROADS: EUROPE AND BEYOND 245
(Charles Goodhart, Daniela Gabor, Jakob Verstegaard & Ismail Ertürk eds., 2014) (describing and evaluating the coordinating role of financial regulatory agencies in the
post-Crisis environment); Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions
of the Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 633–37 (2010) [hereinafter Ahdieh, Visible Hand] (describing the roles of various agencies in facilitating coordination); Robert
B. Ahdieh, Law’s Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. L. REV.
215, 302 (2004) (highlighting the importance of coordination to securities market development).
216. See Ahdieh, supra note 215, at 293 (discussing the power of convening industry actors).
217. See GEITHNER, supra note 146, at 103; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra
note 146, at 19.

2021]

REENGINEERING FINANCIAL MARKETS

2417

technology.218 The regulators invoked no formal legal mechanism to
call the meeting or motivate action.219 Instead, they aimed to bring
awareness to a shared problem and used a mix of “moral suasion”220
and calls to the enlightened self-interest of the banks to do so.221 As
Timothy Geithner, then the president of the New York Fed, put it, the
dealers “had a mutual interest in upgrading their derivatives infrastructure, so we managed to persuade them to upgrade it.”222 Within
a year, the banks had coordinated on a solution: they reduced tradeconfirmation backlogs and increasingly adopted technical standards
for computerized trade-tracking,223 all of which helped dampen the
catastrophe of the Global Financial Crisis.224
In addition to the simple power of convening industry actors in
one place and setting an agenda for them, regulators can also gain
value from creating focal points around specific infrastructural solutions to industry problems.225 The cases exemplify the value of this
practice. For instance, when it was becoming clear that the securities
clearing and settlement system would be overwhelmed by the rising
trading volumes of the 1960s, the SEC published a prominent report
summarizing the state of the market’s operations and challenges.226
Through that report, the SEC raised the profile of one way to implement something like the depository trust institution that William O.
Douglas had first put on the table in the 1930s.227 The SEC’s move was
not to mandate adoption of a depository trust or even to clearly
218. See id.; SCHEIBER, supra note 207, at 211 (describing the scene of the meeting
of the Fourteen Families).
219. The New York Fed only supervised two of the fourteen institutions. See
GEITHNER, supra note 146, at 103. The others were supervised by the other regulators
at the New York Fed-convened table. See id.
220. See Systemic Risk and the Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
221. See GEITHNER, supra note 146, at 103–04.
222. See id.
223. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 146, at 18–25.
224. See supra Part II.B.3.
225. A focal point arises when one solution to a coordination problem gains salience, thereby creating momentum in support of its adoption among the coordinating
parties. See McAdams, supra note 214, at 231–35. Regulators can use the power of their
bully pulpit to create such focal points for industry actors. Cf. Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Wishnick, Technocratic Pragmatism, Bureaucratic Expertise, and the Federal Reserve, 130 YALE L.J. 636, 664–65, 692 (2021) (highlighting the discursive powers of the
Fed).
226. SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at
430 (1963).
227. See generally id.
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threaten regulatory consequences for failing to adopt it. Rather, the
SEC brought awareness to one solution to the paperwork problem and
gave it a “best practices”-like imprimatur of SEC blessing.228 By creating a focal point, the SEC catalyzed the effort to build what eventually
became the DTC.229 This kind of approach is epistemically modest, in
that it still relies on the local knowledge and expertise of industry
players to guide infrastructural evolution, but it places a public force
into the process.
2. The Necessity of Coercion
The tools of coordination are useful, but coordination can only go
so far. At root, coordination is a non-interventionist regulatory stance.
It “emphasize[s] the shaping of expectations rather than the alteration
of incentives,” aims to disseminate “information and knowledge,” and
“focus[es] on the dynamics of groups.”230 When engaging in coordination, regulators act as public supporters of private ordering by removing cognitive and transactional barriers to mutual advancement. But
to get off the ground in the first place, coordination efforts often need
a source of external motivation. In such cases, regulators will need to
coerce reengineering efforts into being, not merely to coordinate
them.
The fundamental limit to coordination is that it fails to address
the divergence between even enlightened industry interests and the
policy interests often at stake in situations where reengineering is being considered. Take, for instance, a potential reengineering effort that
aims at reducing systemic risk: “the risk of socially unbearable macroeconomic consequences” arising from the bankruptcy, distress, or
breakdown of individual financial firms or infrastructure institutions.231 It is fundamental that private actors do not have incentives to
optimally limit systemic risk. “Without regulation, the externalities
caused by systemic risk would not be prevented or internalized because the motivation of market participants ‘is to protect themselves
but not the system as a whole . . . .’”232 These same incentives are at
play when it comes to market infrastructure design. No amount of convening, “moral suasion,” or calls for “enlightened” self-interest will

228. On the general use of best practices, see generally David Zaring, Best Practices,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294 (2006).
229. See supra Part II.B.1.
230. Ahdieh, Visible Hand, supra note 215, at 582.
231. See Levitin, supra note 12, at 446.
232. Schwarcz, supra note 123, at 206.
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make industry actors care about the negative societal spillovers of systemic risk.233
To make optimal use of reengineering where externalities are at
stake, private-sector coordination needs motivation by a bit of muscle.
The tools regulators have available for this purpose are threats and
mandates.
Threats. Agency threats come in many shapes and sizes. Some involve informal statements that, absent “voluntary” industry action, an
agency will write a new rule or impose legal sanctions through enforcement.234 Others involve threats to industry members’ reputations.235 And some involve the threat of new legislation from Congress.236
Regulators used threats to prod along the infrastructural reengineering efforts described in Part II. One particularly stark example involved then-SEC Chairman William O. Douglas after the Whitney securities theft scandal.237 At the time, the SEC lacked any direct statutory
authority to mandate reengineering of the securities settlement system used on Wall Street.238 But recall that Douglas thought that a redesigned settlement system would prevent securities theft and also,
as the Commission put it, “obviate the need” for new regulations at the
same time.239 At first, he used soft tactics, calling on the brokerage industry to “work together” with the SEC to “make this segment of capitalism work” by “launch[ing] a joint program” to develop a central depository trust.240 But when the industry did not move quickly to
pursue Douglas’s idea, he turned to negotiation and threat. Specifically, he treated the SEC’s report on the Whitney scandal as a bargaining chip. He proposed that the SEC would withhold portions of the report from public view for a few months “on [the] condition that the
233. See generally Allen, supra note 123, at 1093–97 (discussing the negative spillovers of financial instability).
234. See Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1844 (2011) (describing public and private threats, either “explicit or implicit,” to undertake “either new rulemaking or enforcement of an existing rule”); see also Daniel Schwarcz & David Zaring, Regulation by Threat: Dodd-Frank and the Nonbank Problem, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1817
(2017) (describing the Dodd-Frank Act’s systemically important financial institution
regime as relying on the threat of onerous regulation to gain voluntary compliance
with the policy norm of financial institution de-risking).
235. See Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE L.J. 907, 914 (2018)
(identifying how threats of reputational harm motivate industry action).
236. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
237. See supra Part II.B.1.
238. The authority to do so would not come until 1975. See supra Part II.B.1.
239. See supra text accompanying note 100.
240. Douglas, supra note 101, at 7, 10.
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President of the [NYSE] and others would use their best efforts to
bring about the adoption” of a central depository institution.241 When
the NYSE still failed to take up the proposal, Douglas ultimately made
good on his threat and publicized the SEC’s report.242 Douglas also
threatened that if the industry still dallied, the Commission “might
find it necessary to recommend to the Congress a program of legislative action” to force the central depository into existence.243 Fortunately for the industry, Douglas was at that point nominated for the
Supreme Court.244 His successor (the famed legal realist Jerome
Frank) lacked either the interest or the will to carry through on Douglas’s threats, and the reengineering plan went dormant until the
1960s.245
A more successful use of threats spurred the construction of CLS
Bank. Recall that the design of the foreign exchange payment system
led to recurring episodes of instability in the banking system throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.246 Though regulators had tried
to spur private-sector action using coordination tools, nothing came
of it until an international consortium of regulators including the Fed
announced they would soon take affirmative measures to “induce private sector progress” in reducing settlement risk.247 This announcement was perceived as “a very clear threat . . . on the part of the major
central banks” that the private sector “had a certain amount of time to
come up with a satisfactory solution to FX settlement risk, or else the
central banks would themselves ‘seek’ a solution.”248 The top-down
options that were “in the wind” during the period included “tough risk
241. Memorandum from Francis T. Greene, Assistant Dir., Trading & Exch. Div.,
SEC, Conference on Monday, August 8, 1938, Relative to Proposals of the New York
Stock Exchange and This Commission for the Safeguarding of Customers’ Funds and
Securities 2 (Aug. 25, 1938), http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/
1938_0825_SafeguardingConferenceT.pdf [https://perma.cc/G76X-WUJA]; see also id.
(“It was made clear by Chairman Douglas that should the efforts of the Administration
of the Stock Exchange to bring about the adoption of a program revolving about a central depository and ultimately a trust institution be unsuccessful, the Commission
would promptly release the Whitney Report discussing all of the proposals which
might thus become necessary.”).
242. See SEC WHITNEY REPORT VOL. 1, supra note 98.
243. Memorandum from Francis T. Greene, supra note 241.
244. William O. Douglas, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
biography/William-O-Douglas [https://web.archive.org/web/20210205225558/
https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-O-Douglas] (Jan. 15, 2021).
245. See supra Part I.C.
246. See supra Part II.B.2.
247. See Schaller, supra note 134, at 44, 47–48.
248. Lacker, supra note 135, at 229.
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control” imposed through traditional regulatory methods, and for “the
central banks themselves to construct their own jointly-operated, centralized [payment-versus-payment] system.”249
As intended, these threats from the Fed and other central banks
provided “a wake-up call for the industry.”250 To stave off stronger
regulatory intervention, leading global banks quickly made plans to
build their own private version of the payment-versus-payment system idea.251
These instances of threat-based motivation are undoubtedly significant in the history of infrastructural reengineering. But they are
being overtaken by instances where regulators rely on explicit statutory grants of authority to mandate infrastructural change.
Mandates. Statutorily authorized mandates are likely to be more
effective, not to mention more legitimate, than threats. The most important sources of statutory authority for our purposes are found in
the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 (’75 Amendments) and the
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.252 These laws enable financial regulators to
facilitate and mandate infrastructural reengineering; I will call them
the sources of “reengineering authority.” They are the main statutory
tools that regulators should consider invoking to mandate privatesector involvement in any reengineering effort.
First, the SEC can use wide-ranging authority in the ’75 Amendments to “play an active role in structuring the public securities markets.”253 These laws enable the SEC to facilitate technological change
in the “communication and data processing facilities” that undergird
the securities trading venues and post-trade systems.254
A second set of statutory tools to prompt infrastructural reengineering can be found in the Dodd-Frank Act. While the ’75 Amendments focus on securities market infrastructure and empower the SEC
alone, the Dodd-Frank Act grants authority to the Fed, SEC, and CFTC
249. Id.
250. Schaller, supra note 134, at 44.
251. See id. at 47–48.
252. For these amendments, see Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (amending
15 U.S.C. §§ 77–78).
253. Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be
Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 160 (2008).
254. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (directing the SEC “to carry out the objectives” of “linking . . .
all markets for qualified securities through communication and data processing facilities”); see also Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure
of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 332 (stating that the ’75 Amendments establish that “the SEC must implement communications technology to facilitate
trading activity among multiple markets”).
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over a wide range of market infrastructure. Most prominently, DoddFrank mandated the construction of central clearinghouses for certain
derivatives contracts that had been cleared on a bilateral basis.255 In
addition, Dodd-Frank requires the CFTC and SEC to develop standardized data formats for trade reporting in various derivatives markets.256 Finally, Dodd-Frank also contains a sweeping source of authority to regulate the design and operation of any market
infrastructure that the group of agency leaders composing the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) deems to be “systemically important.”257 Specifically, Dodd-Frank authorizes the regulators to
“promote uniform standards for the . . . conduct of systemically important” financial activities—language that is broad enough to authorize a range of reengineering endeavors.258
Taken together, these sources of reengineering authority enable
regulators to coerce the private sector into acting, even when doing so
is not in their self-interest. Notably, the absence of this kind of coercive power inhibited pre-Crisis reforms.259 To remedy this problem,
the drafters of Dodd-Frank gave the constituent agencies of the financial regulatory state “adequate authority to compel corrective actions,” rather than merely exhort them.260 Given the incentives at
work in most important reengineering projects, the Dodd-Frank
power to compel beneficial updates to market infrastructure is crucial.

255. See Griffith, supra note 11, at 1309–24.
256. See Certain Swap Data Repository and Data Reporting Requirements, 84 Fed.
Reg. 21,044 (May 13, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 23, 43, 45, 49).
257. 12 U.S.C. § 5461. The FSOC is an “agency-of-agencies,” populated by the heads
of financial regulatory agencies across the administrative state and tasked with maintaining the stability of the financial system. Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to
Wall Street: The New Administrative Process, 65 ADMIN. L.J. 689, 698 (2013).
258. Id. § 5461(b); see also id. § 5464(a)(1) (stating that the agencies “shall prescribe risk management standards” governing covered activities of “designated financial market utilities” and governing “the conduct of designated activities by financial
institutions”).
259. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 51 (2009), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web
.pdf [https://perma.cc/V33L-ZEEX] (“Progress in strengthening payment and settlement arrangements is inherently difficult because improvements in such arrangements require collective action by market participants. Existing federal authority over
such arrangements is incomplete and fragmented. In such circumstances, the Federal
Reserve and other regulators have been forced to rely heavily on moral suasion to encourage market participants to take such collective actions.”).
260. Id. at 52.
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C. REENGINEERING IN SYSTEMIC CONTEXT
The prior Parts examined the first-order utility of reengineering
as a regulatory technique and the public-private interaction it entails.
This Part steps back to consider reengineering in systemic context.
Individual reengineering efforts tend to be market-specific interventions. The DTC only addressed securities theft in the corporate securities markets;261 CLS Bank only addressed Herstatt risk arising
from trades in particular foreign exchange markets;262 and the digitization efforts of the Fourteen Families may have improved data quality in the credit derivatives markets, but they left many other markets
in the dark.263 Reengineering is potentially useful, in other words, at
regulating particular financial activities,264 and doing so within the
confines of today’s existing regulatory regime. By contrast, it cannot
address the deep problems of our crisis-prone financial sector at a
fundamental level.265
But that does not mean that reengineering efforts will lack systemic implications. Rather, as this Part argues, reengineering efforts
hold the capacity to support some approaches to sector-wide governance while also running the risk of creating new problems along the
way. Regulators considering reengineering efforts in the future must
contend with both of these dynamics.

261. Cf. Porter, supra note 184, at 121 (noting that the Fedwire infrastructure handles settlement in government securities markets).
262. See Bech & Holden, supra note 185 (documenting the range of currency pairs
not currently supported by CLS).
263. See supra Part II.B.3.
264. Cf. Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Entities
and Activities: Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L. REV.
1455 (2019) (evaluating the efficacy of activity-based regulation in comparison with
entity-based regulation).
265. For proposals that do aim to achieve such a fundamental restructuring, see
WILMARTH, supra note 124, which argues for the reinstatement of a modernized version of the Glass-Steagall Act; Saule T. Omarova, The People’s Ledger: How to Democratize Money, Finance, and the Economy, 75 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021–22), and
Ricks et al., supra note 38, which explore the implications of widespread availability of
access to Fed bank accounts; and Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 417 (2016), which argues for a separation of lending and
safe-keeping activities in favor of “an absolutist version of 100% reserve banking.” For
commentary on the deep problems left unaddressed post-2008 and the potential for
fundamental reform, see Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the
Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991 (2014).
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1. Reengineering as a Complementary Technique
To address problems in each of Part II’s cases, regulators had a
range of regulatory tools available to them. And just as agencies often
mix policymaking forms like rulemaking and adjudication to achieve
their statutory goals,266 so too can agencies mix and layer different
governance approaches. Take securities theft: Over decades, the SEC
experimented with a mix of industry self-regulation, administrative
enforcement, and eventually the infrastructural effort of pressuring
industry participants to create the DTC.267 And in the case of Herstatt
risk, the Fed pursued a similar multi-tool approach.268 It supported
the adoption of Basel-style capital requirements, continued with
workaday bank supervision, and pushed for the construction of CLS
Bank.269 In both cases, reengineering efforts did not foreclose the use
of other regulatory tools; they complemented them.
In general, reengineering efforts are likely to complement other
approaches to financial regulation in a few ways. First, as in the two
cases just described, a reengineering effort resulting in structural constraints on particular activities might increase the efficacy of other
regulatory tools. Consider the work of a Fed supervisor pre- and postCLS Bank. In the pre-CLS Bank days, a supervisor of a bank with significant foreign exchange exposures would have had to scrutinize its
settlement risk profile. As noted above, this would have been an ongoing task with high variable costs, and the task would have been made
difficult by the dynamic market environment. But in the post-CLS
Bank world, the same supervisor can look to CLS to achieve the goal
of controlling settlement risk. This not only reduces the variable costs
of addressing settlement risk; it also frees up the supervisor’s (and the
supervisory agency’s) resources to deal with other matters while CLS
Bank does important work, automatically and in the background.270
Second, when reengineering efforts make rule violations and financial risks more visible, they make those violations and risks more
susceptible to both private and public discipline. As a result, any increase in surveillance caused by reengineering will complement other
regulatory approaches. In the case of the derivatives back-office

266. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1383, 1399 (2004) (discussing how agencies rely on adjudication, rulemaking, or a
combination of the two).
267. See supra Part II.B.1.
268. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
269. See supra Part II.B.2.
270. See supra Part II.B.2.

2021]

REENGINEERING FINANCIAL MARKETS

2425

reforms, for instance, a shift in visibility led to private discipline.271
When the Fourteen Families came to understand the risks that their
trading practices were producing, they quickly sought to increase
their use of netting arrangements to reduce the magnitude of their
counterparty risks.272 Though these efforts were hardly sufficient to
stop a world-historical financial crisis from taking place, they did help
contain what would have been an even worse meltdown in the OTC
derivatives markets. Similarly, when regulators prompt the adoption
of improved data standards or the construction of trade reporting infrastructure, the resulting increase in market visibility will complement public discipline. Regulators and supervisors who have access to
real-time, machine-readable trade data will be in much better positions when it comes to risk regulation and conduct policing than their
peers were in prior days.
2. Centralization and the Stakes of Catastrophe
Of course, reengineering efforts will not only be complementary
to other regulatory programs. Sometimes, they may make other aspects of the regulatory task more difficult; sometimes, they may create
new problems altogether.
The most striking new problems that may result from reengineering efforts arise from increased centralization of market activities. Both the DTC and CLS Bank exemplify this. Though they each did
much to address preexisting problems that had eluded simple regulatory solutions for years, they also produced new risk of their own. For
these two systems, much of it falls under the umbrella of operational
risk.273 If one of these systems were to be unavailable for even a short
period of time, they could destabilize every one of their participants.
This genre of centralized operational risk is not hypothetical. In 1987,
telecommunications breakdowns in post-trade networks deepened
the Black Monday crash.274 Recent Fedwire outages have caused

271. See supra Part II.B.3.
272. See supra Part II.B.3.
273. Operational risk includes “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed
internal processes, people and systems or from external events.” Christina Parajon
Skinner, Misconduct Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1592 (2016) (quoting BASEL COMM.
ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND
CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK ¶ 644 (2004), http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbsl07.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX9R-TDAR]).
274. See DIANA B. HENRIQUES, A FIRST-CLASS CATASTROPHE: THE ROAD TO BLACK MONDAY, THE WORST DAY IN WALL STREET HISTORY (2017); Ben S. Bernanke, Clearing and Settlement During the Crash, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 133, 146–47 (1990) (describing how
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minor trouble across markets.275 A similar breakdown—or cyber-intrusion—into a centralized financial market infrastructure today
could create or deepen another crisis.276 Similarly, as thousands of law
review pages attest, reengineering efforts that centralize clearing
have the effect of concentrating financial risks.277
The stakes of centralization are such that the drafters of the
Dodd-Frank Act addressed them directly. In title VIII of the Act, Congress gave the FSOC the power to designate “financial market utilities”
or “payment, clearing, or settlement activities” as systemically important via supermajority vote.278 Such a vote subjects designated entities and activities to heightened regulation and supervision, even
over the objection of their “home” agency.279 Under the scrutiny of
their home regulators, along with the FSOC and the Fed, these “systemically important financial market utilities” (SIFMUs) become subject to mandatory reforms to their internal processes and to invasive
supervision designed to reduce the chances of financial catastrophe.280
These risk-management and oversight measures are, of course,
hardly costless. And the harm that could be done if they were to fail is
potentially enormous.281 This raises the question: has the centralization of clearing and settlement processes through reengineering efforts been worth the trade? On this front, it is both striking and ironic
that by my count, regulators have had a guiding hand in the creation
of over half of the SIFMUs subject to heightened supervision today.282
technological and financial problems in post-trade operations exacerbated the market
crash and increased the risk of widespread financial crisis).
275. See Ann Saphir, Fedwire Resumes Operations After Hourslong Disruption, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2021, 12:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-fedwire
-idUSKBN2AO2I1 [https://perma.cc/H5AG-6KG8].
276. On cyber-intrusions, see Darrell Duffie & Joshua Younger, Cyber Runs,
(Hutchins Ctr. on Fiscal & Monetary Pol’y at Brookings, Working Paper No. 51, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/WP51-Duffie-Younger
-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3DD-EKMJ].
277. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 13; Yadav, supra note 137 (reflecting on a decade of
debate).
278. 12 U.S.C. § 5463(a). The Secretary of the Treasury, acting as FSOC chairperson, must be a part of the supermajority. Id.
279. Id. §§ 5464, 5466–5467.
280. See id.
281. See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK
ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 72 (2010).
282. In addition to the DTC and CLS Bank, see supra Parts II.B.1–2, regulators have
been moving forces behind the creation or expansion of two systemically important
derivatives clearinghouses, see, e.g., Yadav, supra note 142, and the precursor to the
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Because the systemic risks posed by the SIFMUs involve lowprobability, high-stakes scenarios, it is a matter of abundant speculation whether the centralization of post-trade infrastructure has ultimately been a good or bad deal.283 At the very least, the creation of
new, systemically risky entities cannot be anything approaching a “final act of policy” that allows regulation to leave the scene.284 Instead,
it trades one set of problems for another. In light of this dynamic, regulators considering new reengineering efforts should clearly be wary
of creating new SIFMUs, and indeed should be especially attendant to
ways of de-risking the existing ones. The next Part turns to a few ideas
along those lines.
IV. FUTURE PROSPECTS

So far, this Article has examined the potential utility of reengineering efforts and developed a framework for evaluating the
tradeoffs they tend to pose. This Part looks to the future. It applies the
framework developed in Part III to evaluate current and potential future reengineering initiatives, and it explores how regulatory mentalities should shift to best capitalize on those possibilities.
A. THREE INITIATIVES

1. T+1: A Structural Constraint on Systemic Risk
Earlier, the case of CLS Bank demonstrated how regulators can
employ reengineering to combat systemic risk.285 Regulators should
more aggressively pursue similar systemic risk-reductions today. This
Part explores one promising idea involving the NSCC. The idea exemplifies the value of mechanical enforcement discussed in Part III.A,286
and it does so in service of reducing centralized systemic risk.287
Recall from Part I.B that the NSCC is the central counterparty
clearinghouse for the corporate securities markets. After market participants trade with one another, the NSCC steps into the middle, becoming “the seller to every buyer and the buyer to every seller” of
Fixed Income Clearing Corporation, see Jeffrey F. Ingber, The Development of the Government Securities Clearing Corporation, 23 ECON. POL’Y REV. 33, 33 (2017).
283. For a summary of a decade’s worth of debate on derivatives CCPs, for instance, see Yadav, supra note 142.
284. This phrase comes from Annelise Riles’s discussion of the Bank of Japan payment system. See RILES, supra note 8.
285. See supra Part II.A.2.
286. See supra Part III.A.1.
287. Cf. supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the centralized risks posed by SIFMUs).
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those trades.288 As a result of this role, the NSCC is a quintessential
“too big to fail” institution.289 It is both a debtor and a creditor of every
major securities dealer and intermediary in the country. If one or
more of those firms were to default on debts to the NSCC, the NSCC
itself would be on the hook to cover the shortfall.290 It would do so by
using its own resources and by drawing on the resources of other securities firms that participate in the clearing network. Such an event
would put pressure on those firms and could lead to the deepening of
an incipient financial crisis.291 Its negative spillover effects could be
many, including a contraction of credit and a widespread reduction in
economic prospects.292 For these reasons, financial regulators have
designated the NSCC as “systemically important.”293
To reduce the risk that the NSCC fails, regulators have a range of
options at their disposal. First, they can impose new risk management
requirements.294 Second, they can supervise the institution with
greater intensity.295 A third possibility, complementary to the other
two, is to impose a structural constraint on the extent of NSCC risktaking.
Today, the SEC indeed may reengineer the NSCC to do just that.
The opportunity involves what is known as the “settlement cycle”—
the time it takes from trade to ultimate settlement.296 This cycle recently gained notoriety for a strange reason: when the retail broker
Robinhood halted trading in volatile “meme” stocks in January 2021,

288. See discussion supra notes 56–60; FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T
TREASURY, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 179 (2012), https://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/fsoc/Documents/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YZ7X-VBTE] (“NSCC plays a prominent role in providing clearance, settlement, and
CCP services for nearly all broker-to-broker equity and corporate and municipal debt
trades executed on major U.S. exchanges and other equity trading venues.”).
289. See, e.g., Felix B. Chang, The Systemic Risk Paradox: Banks and Clearinghouses
Under Regulation, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 747, 751 (“Additionally, the very nature of
clearinghouses ensures that they will be too big to fail . . . .”).
290. For the mechanics of this process at clearinghouses generally, see Paolo
Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When “Skin in the Game” Is Not Enough, the
Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. ON REGUL. 601, 618–23 (2017).
291. Cf. SKEEL, supra note 281 (discussing the consequences of clearinghouse failures and the necessity of avoiding them).
292. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 288, at 182.
293. See id. at 179–83.
294. See 12 U.S.C. § 5464.
295. See id. § 5466.
296. See Rogers, supra note 92, at 1437.
OF THE
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its CEO laid blame on the settlement cycle’s pace.297 But its import
here has little to do with retail brokerage. Rather, from a systemic risk
perspective, the settlement cycle matters because it directly controls
the extent of the financial risk the NSCC itself bears at any given
time.298 Each day that a trade remains unsettled, the NSCC is exposed
to the risk of counterparty default.299 The current timeline for settlement is two days—the so-called “T+2” settlement cycle.300 A shift from
the current cycle to a T+1 cycle would cut the NSCC’s exposure by a
day’s worth of trades, thereby vastly reducing the risk it bears and the
risk it poses to the stability of the financial system.301 A switch to T+0
would reduce NSCC’s exposure even further by limiting it to risks carried on an intraday basis.
If a speed-up of the settlement timeline would reduce the NSCC’s
systemic riskiness, why hasn’t the SEC gone forward with it to date? It
is not for lack of awareness. The SEC has long been aware of the technological possibility of a T+1 or T+0 settlement cycle,302 and in 2015,
a group of independent advocates on the SEC Investor Advisory Committee argued to the SEC that faster settlement would serve the public
297. Specifically, the CEO suggested that extremely high collateral demands made
by the NSCC led to Robinhood’s trading halts. See Annie Massa, Robinhood Says Stock
Settlement Times Are a Wall Street Risk, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-02/robinhood-saga-renews-wall-street
-group-s-move-to-limit-risks [https://perma.cc/88K3-98R9]. In my view, that account
is incomplete, at best. Robinhood itself could have engaged in better liquidity planning
to accommodate its business model, or it could have altered its business model to reduce liquidity risk. Cf. James Surowiecki, Why Robinhood’s PR Nightmare Keeps Getting
Worse, MARKER (Feb. 22, 2021), https://marker.medium.com/robinhood
-demonstrates-how-not-to-communicate-in-a-crisis-3b31c0e60cbc [https://perma
.cc/V6EE-SR8Q] (discussing Robinhood’s liquidity problems in late January 2021). It
makes more sense to blame Robinhood for its trading halts than NSCC collateral requirements.
298. See T+2 Settlement Cycle Adopting Release, supra note 57, at 17–18 (stating
that a shortened settlement cycle “should reduce systemic risk”).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 2.
301. See DEPOSITORY TR. CLEARING CORP., ADVANCING TOGETHER: LEADING THE INDUSTRY TO ACCELERATED SETTLEMENT 2, 5, 9 (2021) (arguing that a shortened settlement cycle would reduce risk to the NSCC and reduce Members’ expected margin requirements).
302. See SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, T+1 BUSINESS CASE FINAL REPORT 11 (2000), https://www
.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/t1-business-case-final-report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YKZ9-FPUM] (stating that technology could enable a shift to T+1 settlement
in 2000); see also JP Koning, The Siren Call of T+0, or Real-Time Settlement, MONEYNESS
(Sept. 27, 2017), http://jpkoning.blogspot.com/2017/09/the-siren-call-of-t0-or-real
-time.html [https://perma.cc/SNM7-6AJ5] (noting that NYSE trades settled on a T+1
timeline for many years prior to 1933).
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interest.303 Further, many markets in the United States currently settle on a faster timeline, including the markets for Treasury securities
and mutual fund shares.304 Based on these precedents, the SEC could
adopt existing models to speed up securities settlement today.
The better explanation is that the SEC has decided to let the securities industry lead on its own. Since the move to a T+2 cycle in 2017,
no member of the Commission or its staff has publicly pushed for
faster settlement.305 Indeed, even amid public debate and early industry explorations of T+1 in the wake of January 2021’s strange meme
stock episode,306 the SEC has so far stayed silent. This hands-off approach follows the pattern of many past SEC uses of the ’75 Amendments’ reengineering authority. As Yuliya Guseva has written, the SEC
has only engaged this authority “following clearly expressed market
concerns and consensus” among industry participants.307 For instance, when considering the eventual shift to T+2, the SEC “did not
choose sides” but rather “allowed the industry to move naturally.”308
This approach of letting the industry decide when and how to update the settlement cycle is wrongheaded. As we saw in Part III.B,
when it comes to systemic risk, the incentives of private actors are out
of alignment with the public interest. Though the firms that mutually
own and operate the NSCC of course would not like to see it fail, they
nevertheless do not internalize the damage that an NSCC failure would
inflict on the public at large.309 Not only could an NSCC failure require
a bailout from the Fed, but it would also roil the markets and
303. See INV. ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE: SHORTENING THE TRADE SETTLEMENT CYCLE IN THE U.S. FINANCIAL MARKETS (2015),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/settlement-cycle
-recommendation-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HM3-6TBT] (“[A] move to shorter settlement cycles will protect . . . investors . . . .”).
304. See id. (“[M]atching the settlement period that already exists for Treasuries
and many mutual funds, would greatly reduce systemic risk . . . .”).
305. The closest any Commissioner has come has been Hester Peirce, who noted
that a shorter settlement cycle “could yield . . . benefits” but then warned against undue
enthusiasm for real-time settlement schemes. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, Sec. Exch.
Comm’n, Address at the George Washington University Law School Regulating the Digital Economy Conference: Atomic Trading (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/peirce-atomic-trading-2021-02-22 [https://perma.cc/BS4G-KHE3].
306. See DEPOSITORY TR. CLEARING CORP., supra note 301.
307. Yuliya Guseva, Destructive Collectivism: Dodd-Frank Coordination and Clearinghouses, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1693, 1729–30 (2016).
308. Id. at 1730.
309. Cf. Saguato, supra note 290, at 631–32 (discussing situations in which clearinghouses are “unable to contain and internalize” the costs of their failures); id. at 613
(noting that NSCC is a member-owned mutual firm).
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contribute to broader panic in a crisis situation.310 To prevent these
negative spillovers to the public, the NSCC should not be left to its own
devices. Rather, because of the value to the public of reducing the
NSCC’s systemic riskiness—not to mention reducing the need for SEC
oversight and supervision—the SEC should consider coercing an effort to shorten the settlement cycle.
To place pressure on the industry and ensure it neither stalls nor
slow-walks a beneficial change, the SEC should make more aggressive
use of the powers contained in the ’75 Amendments. First, the SEC
should use its statutory authority to reconvene an expert body called
the Market Transactions Advisory Committee (MTAC), which has
been dormant since the 1990s.311 The MTAC would be a fifteen-member committee, organized and operated pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act.312 It would enable SEC commissioners to leverage subject-matter expertise from outside the agency but without
having to rely too heavily on the expertise of interested industry participants.313 And it could be charged by the SEC with reporting on a
wide range of matters related to securities transfer procedures.314 The
Commission should use this power to task the MTAC with studying the
question of settlement cycle speed. Specifically, a revived MTAC
should have the remit of gathering evidence on the feasibility, costs,
and benefits of reengineering a faster securities post-trade process.
With that power in hand, the MTAC could engage with technology vendors, investor advocates, and public-interest groups to assess how
best to de-risk securities clearing and settlement. In so doing, it would
bring an independent and well-informed perspective to bear on a

310. Cf. Baker, supra note 73, at 109–10 (describing the expansion of the Federal
Reserve’s “safety net” to include clearinghouses that have been designated as systemically important by the FSOC).
311. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(f)(4) (describing the MTAC formation process and substantive ambit); see also Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Roles of Individuals in UCC Reform:
Is the Uniform Law Process a Potted Plant? The Case of Revised UCC Article 8, 27 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 553, 564–72 (2002) (describing the origins and products of the original
MTAC). Note that while I characterize the MTAC provision as a part of the ’75 Amendments, it was, to be precise, an amendment to the Amendments. See id.
312. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(f)(4)(B) (describing the composition of the committee).
313. Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Outside Advisers Inside Agencies, 108 GEO.
L.J. 1139, 1148 (2020) (describing the service provided by FACA committees).
314. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(f)(4)(A) (“The Advisory Committee shall be directed to
consider and report to the [SEC] on such matters as the [SEC], after consultation with
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines, including [matters related to the laws governing securities transfer].”).
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topic that is simultaneously technical and of significant public importance.315
If the SEC does not take up this effort, the Federal Reserve should
use its title VIII authority to step into the void. Pursuant to that authority, the Fed has the power to backstop the SEC’s oversight of the
NSCC. If the SEC’s requirements are “insufficient to prevent or mitigate . . . risks” to financial stability, then the Fed can force remedial
evaluation.316 The SEC would then be required by law to revisit its
own approach to NSCC risk management.317 While it is possible that
the implementation costs of speeding the settlement cycle could exceed the benefits, that judgment could be made only after a public-interested regulator has taken a wide range of technical options under
consideration. Federal Reserve leadership on this question would represent an improvement on the SEC’s current approach of deference to
industry members. That approach is a clear abdication of the congressional mandate found in the ’75 Amendments and the Dodd-Frank Act
and a failure in light of the basic mismatch between the NSCC’s interests and the public interests that Congress has entrusted to the SEC.318
2. The CAT: Cross-Venue Surveillance in the Securities Market
The problem of market manipulation—whether through frontrunning, spoofing, insider trading, or otherwise—threatens to undermine the integrity of the securities markets.319 As one might expect,
the market manipulators who engage in these tactics usually aim to
cloak their actions in secrecy. One goal of the SEC’s CAT effort, first
mentioned in the Introduction, is to bring emerging forms of market
manipulation out of the shadows. Though it exemplifies the potential
utility of architectural regulation, it has largely been a failure in terms
of process.
315. Cf. Omarova, supra note 40, at 488–89 (describing the value of independent
experts in terms of bringing “political visibility and social salience” to issues that are
frequently off the public radar).
316. 12 U.S.C. § 5464(a)(2)(B).
317. See id. § 5464(a)(2)(D) (requiring the SEC to respond to any Federal Reserve
challenge “with a detailed analysis as to why existing prudential requirements are sufficient, or submit an explanation describing the actions to be taken in response” to the
Federal Reserve challenge).
318. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 5461(a)(4)(C)–(D),
5464(b)(3)–(4) (stating the purposes of the Dodd-Frank market infrastructure oversight provisions, including the purposes of “reduc[ing] systemic risks” and “support[ing] the stability of the broader financial system”).
319. “Market integrity” refers to the goals of fairness, orderliness, and pricing that
accurately reflects a security’s fundamental value. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, IOSCO’s
Response to the Financial Crisis, 37 J. CORP. L. 849, 897 (2012).
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The surveillance functions for which the SEC aims to build the
CAT are as old as the markets themselves. The earliest form of market
surveillance was informal and peer-based. As with the lobstermen famously profiled by James Acheson320 and the goldminers of Jackass
Gulch recently described by Gillian Hadfield,321 the traders of the
NYSE and other exchanges kept tabs on each other with a watchful
eye. This “crowd monitoring” relied on the physical architecture of the
trading floor.322 Participants were, as one NYSE official put it, “not
over in a closet or up on a pillar [but rather] . . . standing down on the
floor . . . so that there is almost—you might say—a check-up on [them]
every single minute.”323 Reports of participants ratting each other out
for prohibited actions are numerous.324 The rules of the floor were
supported by the mutual surveillance of the crowd.
As market activity grew over the course of the twentieth century,
the private stock exchanges and the SEC increasingly turned to “programmatic” surveillance methods.325 For instance, by 1992, the
NYSE’s Intermarket Surveillance Information System was already
producing a massive audit trail—“a sequential reconstruction of trading in each stock, identifying the time of trade, the buying and selling
member firms, the Floor brokers who represented the orders involved, and whether the trade was for a member firm proprietary account.”326 Analysts would sit at “sophisticated computer workstations” to “quickly reconstruct market activity” if something looked
amiss.327 The SEC, for its part, has long acted as “an additional independent monitor for all securities transactions.”328 The Commission
not only oversees the surveillance activities of operators like the
NYSE; it also ingests a range of private data feeds to sift through when
320. See JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 73–75 (1988) (describing
the mutual monitoring of lobster-fishing boundaries by the lobstermen themselves).
321. See GILLIAN K. HADFIELD, RULES FOR A FLAT WORLD 21–22 (2017) (describing
mutual monitoring among gold miners during the California Gold Rush).
322. WALTER MATTLI, DARKNESS BY DESIGN 67 (2019).
323. Id. at 65.
324. See id. at 66–67 (detailing a trading story from Robert Seijas).
325. Cf. Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Business in an Age
of Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1573–74 (2019) (discussing systematic and routine information collection in business contexts under the heading of “programmatic”
monitoring).
326. James L. Cochrane, Brian McNamara, James E. Shapiro & Michael J. Simon, The
Structure and Regulation of the New York Stock Exchange, 18 J. CORP. L. 57, 66 (1992).
327. Id.
328. Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence
of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
1007, 1037 (1990).
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it seeks to uncover problematic conduct or engage in a market crash
post-mortem.
Over the past two decades, however, this system of surveillance
has broken down. The cause of the breakdown is the increasing decentralization and fragmentation of trading activity across many trading venues.329 As Yesha Yadav has recently written, this fragmentation
“generates enormous logistical and institutional costs for exchanges
seeking to monitor, surveille, and discipline” wayward traders.330 Impermissible actions that surveillance might have caught in the days of
centralized trading now go undetected.331
A range of regulatory interventions might remedy this situation.
Yadav, for instance, has proposed a change in liability regime to address the problem of weak oversight.332 The CAT represents a technological complement to such proposals. In essence, the CAT aims to recreate what has been lost through the fragmentation of the stock
market and, further, to deepen the granularity of data that the SEC receives. The plan for the CAT is to become the “ultimate unraveler of
the mysteries of the stock market: a vast database [to] enable regulators to look at who has been trading what in the sub-second trading
world that exists today. And not just trades that take place: every bid
and offer . . . [whether] executed or not.”333 When it is completed, it
will gather this information, in standardized formats, from every regulated securities and SEC-regulated trading venue, requiring alterations in underlying data structures or translational systems across numerous operators.334
But the CAT blueprint has taken exceedingly long to even begin
constructing. And the slow pace of the project highlights the inherent
risks of failing to effectively manage a reengineering effort’s core public-private relationships. Recall from Part III.B that the ’75
329. Yesha Yadav, Oversight Failure in Securities Markets, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1799,
1804 (2020).
330. Id.
331. Id.; see also Frank Pasquale, Law’s Acceleration of Finance: Redefining the Problem of High-Frequency Trading, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2085, 2114–16 (2015) (describing
the SEC’s frustrations on this front).
332. See Yadav, supra note 329, at 1809 (proposing a liability regime for trading
venue operators).
333. Bob Pisani, It’s Google Vs. Amazon To Create the Biggest Database in History,
CNBC: TRADER TALK, https://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/26/its-google-vs-amazon-to
-create-the-biggest-data-base-in-history.html [https://perma.cc/H3UU-7YJC] (Apr.
27, 2016, 7:31 AM).
334. See Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45,722, 45,765 (Aug. 1, 2012) (detailing proposed Rule 613(c)(3) and comments to the proposed rule).
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Amendments gave the SEC wide-ranging authority to coerce industry
actors into reengineering their own infrastructure. The importance of
using these provisions with a real enforcement threat behind them is
exemplified by the SEC’s struggle to get the CAT project off the ground.
Almost nine years after its kick-off, the CAT remains in a state of partial completion.335 The story is one of delay after delay: a four-year
search for a database provider, insufficient plans rejected by the SEC,
and the longest hiring process for a chief information security officer
“in history.”336 As presidential administrations changed over from
Obama to Trump to Biden, and the SEC switched from majority-Democrat to majority-Republican and back again, one constant has been
the CAT: a potentially valuable system to help the SEC carry out its
statutory duties to police market integrity, but a policy albatross and
a procedural quagmire.337
A large portion of these delays can be chalked up to failed incentives. To date, not one fine has been issued by the SEC for industry
slowness, and the SEC has indicated that it will continue to let construction delays slide.338 In the future, regulators using the ’75
Amendments should be sure to back up their calls for action with real
threats of civil penalties for failure to act.
3. Data Standardization: Primitives for Systemic Oversight
A third example of potentially valuable reengineering can be
found in the realm of systemic oversight. To prevent crises before they
happen (and to contain them once they begin to unfold), financial regulators are increasingly working to develop the “robust ability to
335. See Hayley McDowell, US Consolidated Audit Trail Timeline Disrupted Due to
COVID-19, TRADE (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.thetradenews.com/us-consolidated
-audit-trail-timeline-disrupted-due-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/V82T-L7YJ] (describing delayed milestones); Andrew Ramonas, SEC on Course To Fix “Worst Executed” Audit Trail, Clayton Says, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 19, 2019, 10:10 AM), https://news
.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/sec-on-course-to-fix-worst-executed
-audit-trail-clayton-says [https://perma.cc/5DJ3-5B3Y] (reporting the SEC’s plan to
ensure a working CAT by 2022).
336. James Rundle & Anthony Malakian, CAT’s Tale: How Thesys, the SROs and the
SEC Mishandled the Consolidated Audit Trail, WATERSTECHNOLOGY (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.waterstechnology.com/regulation/4152906/cats-tale-how-thesys-the
-sros-and-the-sec-mishandled-the-consolidated-audit-trail [https://perma.cc/SB44
-AWSL].
337. See Ramonas, supra note 335 (noting that then-current SEC Chairman Jay
Clayton has called the CAT “one of the worst conceived, worst executed projects I’ve
seen,” but has also doubled down on its completion).
338. See Rundle & Malakian, supra note 336 (noting that, despite delays, “an enforcement action from the SEC failed to materialize”).
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monitor the economy and quickly detect mounting risks.”339 This
oversight ability requires an essential input: useful data.340 Specifically, to effectively monitor the financial system as a whole, regulators
need access to financial data that are detailed, comprehensive, rapidly-updated, and machine-readable.341 While many useful sources of
data exist today, regulators should work to identify ways of producing
and centralizing that data more effectively.342
The necessity of wide-ranging data was revealed in the Global Financial Crisis, when regulators were caught off-guard by their ignorance of important market activities and counterparty relationships.343 For instance, they lacked information about major
dependencies between firms transacting in crucial short-term funding
markets.344 They also lacked awareness of the systemic importance of
some firms operating outside the traditional regulatory perimeter.345
339. Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and Its Challenges, 47 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1181, 1219 (2015). For discussion of the distinct practices of prevention and containment, see generally Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV.
1051 (2009).
340. See McCoy, supra note 339 (describing the issue of information deficit post2008).
341. See Mark D. Flood, H.V. Jagadish & Louiqa Raschid, Big Data Challenges and
Opportunities in Financial Stability Monitoring, 20 FIN. STABILITY REV. 129, 129 (2016)
(arguing in favor of adopting novel means to adapt to “the ubiquity of data in financial
markets”); see also OFF. OF FIN. RSCH., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT
71
(2013),
https://www.financialresearch.gov/annual-reports/files/office-of
-financial-research-annual-report-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8TH-NKWC] (“Comprehensive, timely, and granular data are essential to the . . . ability to conduct the . . .
financial stability monitoring, analysis, and research . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
342. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Disclosure Universes and Modes of Information: Banks,
Innovation, and Divergent Regulatory Quests, 31 YALE J. ON REGUL. 565, 647 (2014)
(“Massive amounts of data relating to banks and individual financial transactions are
available to a spectrum of governmental bodies.”); cf. Berner & Judge, supra note 141,
at 5–7 (“In this environment, policymakers inevitably operate with an incomplete understanding of how the financial system works and how it will respond to regulatory
intervention.”). For a discussion of ongoing efforts and their place within the financial
regulatory state, see generally Dan Awrey & Kathryn Judge, Why Financial Regulation
Keeps Falling Short, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2295, 2340–42 (2020).
343. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J.
ON REGUL. 91, 99–100 (2012) (“Before Dodd-Frank, no regulator or supervisor had the
authority to look across the full sweep of the financial system—including less-regulated segments—and take action when it perceived a threat. In fact, regulators and
market participants did not even have enough data to understand how interconnected
the market was.”).
344. Id.; see Saguato, supra note 13, at 113–14, 120–25 (describing repo market
opacity and proposing enhanced visibility for the market).
345. See, e.g., Patricia A. McCoy, Systemic Risk Oversight and the Shifting Balance of
State and Federal Authority over Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1389, 1406 (2015)
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Taken as a whole, during the Crisis, “[t]he lack of high-quality, consistent, and accessible data was a key source of risk.”346
While regulators have undertaken efforts to shore up the data
picture, today’s sources still overlook key areas of financial activity.347
They also suffer from design flaws related to the intermittent nature
of their transmission, the low level of detail they contain, and the poor
quality of their presentation.348 For example, the recent market turmoil sparked by the COVID-19 pandemic raised questions about regulators’ access to necessary data about leveraged lending to corporate
borrowers across economic sectors.349 These loans—which are extended to corporations with high levels of debt and often bundled into
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)—have grown significantly over
the last few years.350 Though it has not yet come to pass in the current
crisis, widespread defaults on these loans have been theorized as a
potential trigger for deep distress among financial institutions who
hold them on their balance sheets, risking a systemic event.351
(describing the opacity of the American International Group’s systemic importance before its downfall).
346. OFF. OF FIN. RSCH., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2012),
https://www.financialresearch.gov/annual-reports/files/office-of-financial-research
-annual-report-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/42RM-27NK].
347. See Saguato, supra note 13, at 120–25 (arguing for reforms to make the repo
market more transparent); Pasquale, supra note 331, at 2113–17 (describing efforts
among financial regulators to collect sufficient data to support effective supervision
and enforcement).
348. See, e.g., Andrew F. Tuch, The Remaking of Wall Street, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 315,
365–66 (2017) (noting that regulators lack sufficient information to oversee the growing importance of non-bank lenders); see also Daniel Carpenter & Patricia A. McCoy,
Keeping Tabs on Financial Innovation: Product Identifiers in Consumer Financial Regulation, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 195, 216 (2013) (highlighting the lack of linkage between
different databases as a problem for financial regulation).
349. See Hannah Lang, Virus Could Deal Blow to Leveraged Loans. What’s That Mean
for Banks?, AM. BANKER (Mar. 11, 2020, 2:26 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/
news/virus-could-deal-blow-to-leveraged-loans-whats-that-mean-for-banks
[https://perma.cc/3XF4-UHZG] (discussing the worries of regulators that the pandemic could have spurred a rerun of the prior crisis).
350. See William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Tale of Two Markets: Regulation
and Innovation in Post-Crisis Mortgage and Structured Finance Markets, 2020 U. ILL. L.
REV. 47, 97–104 (describing the rise of CLOs); Sung Eun (Summer) Kim, Managing Regulatory Blindspots: A Case Study of Leveraged Loans, 32 YALE J. ON REGUL. 89, 98–99
(2015) (examining CLOs in the context of other factors that have “played a role in expanding . . . leveraged loans”).
351. See Kim, supra note 350, at 110–12 (explaining that a “cross-default” scenario
is a sufficiently foreseeable reason to regulate in the face of “inevitable downturns”).
But see Christina Parajon Skinner, Nonbank Credit, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 149, 152 (2019)
(arguing that many leveraged lenders provide a countercyclical source of credit).
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Yet, despite their growing systemic importance, leveraged loans
currently exist in a relative data desert. At present, there is no central
market infrastructure that collects transaction-by-transaction data in
standardized, machine-readable formats for leveraged lending.352
Further, many market participants fall outside the existing regulatory
perimeter for entity-specific data collections.353 And while private
data sources provide some information, these sources are often prepared monthly; they also only provide a sliver of insight into the interconnections and dependencies that regulators must understand to do
their jobs.354
In many ways, the leveraged loan and CLO markets exist in a state
of opacity comparable to the derivatives market in 2005.355 With no
centralized infrastructure for trade-data collection, regulators are
cobbling together existing data sources to develop a sense of market
activity. But this approach leaves them prone to overlooking risks and
relationships that pose destabilizing threats. In particular, as the Financial Stability Board recently stated, “limited information on indirect linkages between bank and non-banks [through the leveraged
loan and CLO markets] makes it difficult to assess possible risks from
spillovers and interconnectedness, and their systemic implications.”356 One lesson of the Global Financial Crisis is that no important
market should be so opaque from the macroprudential perspective.
Though regulators could attempt to increase firm-specific data
collections to address the problem, a less discretionary, more durable
approach would be to pursue a reengineering effort, calling on industry actors to construct a trade repository for leveraged lending. By
contrast to firm-provided data collections, a trade repository would
collect relevant trade data as a mandatory byproduct of transacting in
the first place. The attractiveness of the option would depend on the
value of immediate, automated data delivery compared with the
352. See Systemic Risk: Taking It to the House, LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASS’N
(June 9, 2019), https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/systemic-risk-taking-it-to-the
-house [https://perma.cc/5ZP5-ZALT].
353. See Parajon Skinner, supra note 351, at 155 n.32 (stating that “regulatory data
on private funds is sparse”).
354. Cf. CLOs: Not So Opaque, LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASS’N (June 20, 2019),
https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/clos-not-so-opaque [https://perma.cc/6XJP
-3426] (arguing that the availability of Thomson Reuters’s “Leveraged Loan Monthly”
should allay policymakers’ concerns about the market’s opacity).
355. See supra Part II.B.3.
356. FIN. STABILITY BD., VULNERABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH LEVERAGED LOANS AND COLLATERALIZED LOAN OBLIGATIONS 2 (2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/
P191219.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XJP-3426].
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difficulty of enlisting industry actors to coordinate on the development of a new infrastructural system. In this, public benefits in terms
of improved macroprudential supervision would trade off against private costs of construction and public costs of oversight. But here again,
regulators should not wait for poorly incentivized private firms to act.
B. A PROACTIVE ROLE FOR REGULATORS
The ideas presented in the preceding Part represent the tip of the
iceberg of possibilities for infrastructural reengineering,357 but they
nevertheless offer a sense of how regulators should think about engaging in the practice. They also highlight the public-private dynamics
that reengineering inevitably entails. If regulators hope to leverage
the power of market technology, they will need to do much more than
respond to private innovation; they must play a catalytic role in pressing for change.
Doing so may require an ideological shift within the agencies.
Decades of practice and theory have made the roles of reaction and
facilitation—of “keeping pace” and not “getting in the way”—central
to the financial regulatory mindset.358 Indeed, today, leaders at the
SEC, CFTC, and Fed continue to espouse those conceptions of their
tasks. They express fears of “heel-dragging” in response to private
technological innovation359 and hopes for “enabl[ing]” the development of private technologies.360 They even have built entire organizational sub-units devoted to celebrating the creativity of private innovators. For instance, the CFTC has created LabCFTC to serve as “the
focal point for the CFTC’s efforts to promote responsible financial
technology (fintech) innovation,” and the “hub for the agency’s
357. Regarding public-private reengineering efforts, see, for example, Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., Beyond Intermediation: A New (Fintech) Model for Securities Holding Infrastructures, 22 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 286, 387–89 (2020), which calls for the reengineering of
the central securities depository system. See also Berner & Judge, supra note 141, at 3–
5 (exploring opportunities for greater data standardization); Saguato, supra note 13,
at 88–89 (arguing for reforms to repo infrastructure); Hilary J. Allen, Payments Failure,
62 B.C. L. REV. 453 (2021) (exploring technological solutions to operational risk in the
retail payments system). For purely public ideas, see sources cited supra note 38.
358. See sources cited supra note 1; cf. Coglianese, supra note 19 (discussing the
pace-keeping problem across the administrative state); Marchant, supra note 19, at
199 (same).
359. Hester Peirce, Comm’r, SEC, Address at the Securities Enforcement Forum:
How We Howey 4 (May 9, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-how-we
-howey-050919 [https://perma.cc/WNP3-XUNU].
360. See LabCFTC Overview, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, https://www
.cftc.gov/LabCFTC/Overview/index.htm [https://perma.cc/WV5P-SKF6] (listing
LabCFTC’s goals).
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engagement with the fintech innovation community.”361 By contrast,
they espouse less enthusiasm for affirmatively leading the process.
These views fit with dominant academic conceptions of the regulatory role, as well. The main narrative applied to the regulation-innovation relationship in the financial sector always begins with a novel
financial product or market technology developed for private
profit.362 From the electronic trading venues currently ascendant to
innovations driven by distributed ledger technology being championed across the financial sector, the narrative aptly captures important innovations—but only those developed by the “Wall Street
‘rocket scientists’”363 of the private sector. It has no place for regulatory leadership in infrastructural reengineering.
To remedy this regulatory and scholarly mismatch, we need a
conception of regulators as affirmative catalysts for technological and
institutional change. Scholarly insights from outside the field of financial regulation can inform the development of a new approach. In different domains, legal scholars have begun developing ideas about
what it takes for successful “entrepreneurial administration” and
about the role of the state as an affirmative driver of technological
change.364 Future work in financial regulation should endeavor to
build on these insights and apply them to the context of the financial
sector.
Once the reality of regulatory leadership becomes apparent, a
range of questions opens up. For instance, which institutional forms
best support it? What does the role of regulator-as-catalyst require in
terms of personnel? In addition to learning from the past efforts examined in this Article, financial regulators also have much to learn
from innovation-generating regulatory approaches across the administrative state. But regardless of the specific shape it takes, a dynamic
financial regulatory state will be able to actively lead efforts of technological change.

361. LabCFTC, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/
LabCFTC/index.htm [https://perma.cc/HW73-W37K].
362. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 37.
363. Hu, supra note 18, at 1613.
364. Philip J. Weiser, Entrepreneurial Administration, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2011, 2012
(2017); see, e.g., Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 387, 392–95 (2017) (“Most basically, innovation policy
should be at the core of environmental policy—and likely other areas of policy as
well.”).
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CONCLUSION
Financial markets rely on complex infrastructural systems to intermediate transactions. Though many of these systems are constructed and operated by private-sector actors, they need not be designed to serve private interests, alone. To the contrary, financial
regulators have the ability to reengineer infrastructural systems in
service of public policy goals.
As this Article shows, the significance of this ability cuts against
conventional understandings of the role of the state in financial-market evolution. It also highlights a range of possibilities for regulators
to achieve policy goals through the governing force of market infrastructure design. But though the practice of infrastructural reengineering can be powerful, it is far from automatic, nor automatically
beneficial. Regulators who attempt it must think creatively about how
technology can be utilized to achieve regulatory priorities, must manage complex public-private interactions, and must take stock of the
systemic consequences of infrastructural reengineering. They must
also reimagine their own roles by embracing their ability to galvanize
technological and institutional change. Only then will they be able to
take full advantage of the ability to reengineer the infrastructure of
the financial markets.

